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The research focused on two different themes: to understand how current tools in the 
realistic global cyber environment RGCE were used by defender teams for situation 
awareness during cyber security exercise. The second research theme focused on how 
defender teams collected, analyzed and shared cyber threat intelligence during the cyber 
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The research was conducted as empirical study containing both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. Cyber security exercise course was used as a case study and two 
different surveys were sent to the members of the defender teams in the cyber security 
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in cyber exercise improve the situation awareness, as the defender teams failed to collect 
relevant cyber security threat intelligence.  There is a need for further research how 
defender teams handle the cyber threat intelligence in cyber exercises to understand what 
issues needs to be considered when planning cyber exercises. 
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1 Introduction 
Sharing cyber threat intelligence is seen as one of the major issues when fighting 
against cyber crime.  In Europe, the European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA) has started to improve co-operation between national 
and covermental Computer Security Information Response Teams (CSIRT) (Directive 
(EU) 2016/1148). In the United States, similar co-operation between private security 
organizations is to improved by the Department of Homeland Security (Executive 
Order No. 13691). 
Sharkov (2016, 1) points out in his keynote speech in 23rd ACM Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security that in future the challenge is to have cyber 
resilience, which means that nations and organizations should be prepared for 
unforseeable and unpredictable unknowns i.e “unknown unknowns” threats in 
cyberspace.  “Unknown unknowns” are the risks or threats which have not yet been 
identified by anyone (Sharkov 2016, 2). It is the unknown, for example 
softwarevulnerabilities that no-one has not yet found out. 
When handling cyber security incidents, collabaroation is seen as an effective way to 
mitigate threats (Directive (EU) 2016/1148). Even if there is not trust between 
involved organizations, the collaboration network and sharing the infromation can 
help to handle the cyber incidents or mitigate the threats (Garrido-Pelaz, González-
Manzano & Pastrana 2016, 9; Kokkonen 2016, 130). 
Cyber exercises are one way to train organizations to handle cyber incidents. Cyber 
exercises are arranged in isolated closed cyber ranges so that organizations can train 
in practice how to mitigate different kinds of threats affecting their critical assets. 
By definition in cyber exercise the cyber security incident is a reported and managed 
event, which is seen and identified by an organization, as defender team, to be 
something which needs to be reacted to and investigated further (Lötjönen 2017, 
43).  
In a cyber exercise multiple organizations can train co-operation. They might have 
mutual intrests to mitigate cyber security incidents because the organizations might 
have business relations e.g. organization 1 providing software as service, platform as 
10 
 
 
service or security as service to organization 2. Collaboration is needed when 
organizations and their information systems depend on each other. Service level 
agreements are defined to ensure that each envolved organization knows their own 
responsibilities to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the agreed 
assets.   
Since 2011, JAMK University of Applied Sciences, the Institute of Information 
Technology has been a driving force to create JYVSECTEC (Jyväskylä Security 
Technology) as an independent cyber security research, training and development 
center. The technical environment for cyber security exercises is called RGCE, 
realistic global cyber environment. (Vatanen et all 2017, 2) 
Lötjönen, in his master thesis (Lötjönen, 2017) has defined a set of requirements for 
a cyber security situational awareness system for the defender in cyber security 
exercises held in RGCE. The defined system should help the defender to resolve 
cyber security incidents fast and effectively. When organizations participate in a 
cyber security exercise, threat intelligence is needed in order to be able to 
understand the ongoing situation (Lötjönen 2017, 41-42). The situation awareness 
system contains several components as defined in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Situational awareness system (Lötjönen 2017, 42) 
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The proposed system contains a database, where cyber threat intelligence is 
collected during the exercise (Lötjönen 2017, 58-60), however it is not a mandatory 
requirement to use an additional threat intelligence sharing platform to collect and 
share the cyber threat intelligence between defender teams. 
This thesis is assigned by JYVSECTEC, as it is currently planning the new situation 
awareness system based the requirement specification. There is a need to 
understand how current tools are used for situation awareness, not only at individual 
level, but also at team level as well. 
The aim of this thesis is to understand what kind of threat intelligence is gathered, 
how it is shared between defender teams and how the shared information is used to 
mitigate cyber security threats. The outcome of this thesis should help JYVSECTEC to 
plan cyber security exercises in future. 
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2 Knowledge in cyber defence 
2.1 Cyber threat intelligence 
Figure 2 is a cyber threat intelligence model (Mavroeidis & Bromander 2017, 2), 
which presents what kind of information can be collected when investigating cyber 
security incident or what kind of information can be collected from multiple sources 
to gain cyber threat intellignce. The collected cyber threat intelligence should help 
organisations to manage cyber threats and help them to enhance cyber defence 
(Borum, et al. 2015).  
 
 
Figure 2. Cyber Threat Intelligence Model (Mavroeidis & Bromander 2017, 2) 
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When collecting cyber threat intelligence, the goal is to identify the threat actor, 
what motivates the threat actor and what goals the actor has as there cannot be 
strategy without goals. (Mavroeidis & Bromander 2017, 3).  
TTPs i.e tactics, techniques and procedures are the technical knowledge that threat 
actor uses to achieve the goals (Mavroeidis & Bromander 2017, 3). Attack patterns 
are a way to group known attack types together, for example denial of service (DoS) 
or phishing emails.  
Malware is usually a piece of software, which needs to be inserted into the target 
system for future use. Tools are used by threat actors to perform the actual attacks 
or to carry out technical reconnaissance to find out about possible vulnerabilities of 
the target. 
Atomic indicator is the smallest piece of information to be used to detect and defend 
against cyber security threat, e.g. cryptographic hash value of a malware executable 
or an email address of a known spam bot. (Mavroeidis & Bromander 2017, 3; 
Johnson, et al 2016, 2). 
The indicators of compromise (IOC) are a well documented set of atomic indicators 
defining a campaign grouping all relevant gathered information related to it: TTPs, 
atomic indicators, tools, threat actors, malware, etc. (Mavroeidis & Bromander, 
2017, 3). 
Course of actions are the techiques and procedures of the target to mitigate the  
threat actor to achieve their goals (Mavroeidis & Bromander 2017, 3). One way to 
mitigate the threats is to follow up different kind of security alerts such as Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE®) List (MITRE) or National Vulnerability Database 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology), which often contains information 
how to mitigate the vulnerability.  Threat intelligence reports are also a good way to 
improve the situational awarenss of an organization (Johnson et al. 2016). Often, 
these are relased together with the CVEs. 
The quality of the collected threat intelligence is an increasing problem, when 
organiations and individual security analysts starts to collaborate to create, share, 
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improve and use it as organisations needs it to improve their cyber defence  (Al-
Ibrahim et al. 2017; Borum, et al. 2015; Sillaber, et al.  2016).  
Organisations needs to have strategic cyber security intelligence to decrease the risk 
of cyber security incident (Borum et al. 2015).  Sharkov (2016, 4) defines that  
organisations needs to have cyber security resilience. Cyber security resilience 
context is shown in  Figure 3.  
Sharkov defines the “known knowns” as the known threats against the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. For example critical systems 
have duplicated network connections to ensure that systems can be accessed when 
needed.  Virus scanners are another example how to be prepared for the known 
threats. (Sharkov 2016, 2.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sharkov (2016, 2) defines “known unknowns” as the way to handle the advanced 
persistent threats (APTs) in complicated cyber space where handling the threaths 
requires co-operation between one ore more organizations.  
“Unknown unknowns” are the risks or threats which have not yet been identified by 
anyone (Sharkov 2016, 2). It is the unknown, for example any operating system or 
Unknown unknowns 
Known unknowns 
Known knowns 
Cyber resilience 
Cyber security 
Information security 
Figure 3. Cyber resilience context (Sharkov 2016, 2) 
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used software might have vulnerabilities that no-one has not yet found out. When 
organisations are improving the cyber defence, the key is to be prepared to any kind 
of incident.  
It can be considered that when an organization is going to have a cyber security 
exercise, it prepares to handle a set of “unknown unknown” attack patterns.  If the 
organization gains valuable and accurate information e.g.  about a new vulnerability 
in their used software while preparing for the cyber security exercise, it is no longer 
an ”unknown unknow”.  It can be assumed that when new vulnerability is found, 
there will be or already exists e.g.  unknown unknown tool, malware or attack 
pattern which can be used by the threat actor in the cyber security exercise.  
When atomic indicators of the tools or malware are found and identified, they are 
known knowns and security controls can be configured to detect the malware. The 
threat can be mitigated, for example, by updating the vulnerable software when a 
patch is available.  
2.2 Managing the cyber threat intelligence as knowledge 
The cyber threat intelligence can also be seen as piece of information, knowledge or 
data. IOCs are a well documented set of atomic indicators i.e data. Cyber security 
incident is a set of information and data describing what happened and when. It 
might also contain the data about what IOC’s were seen and the information on how 
the incident was resolved. The cyber security incident will evolve to be knowledge 
when individual organisation members reuses the gathered information when 
resolving similar kind of cyber security incidents.  
It is a philosophical question how to define data, information and knowledge, 
however, the most common interpretation is that data is a simple isolated fact. 
When several facts are groupped, combined or structured in a context, data can be 
called a piece of information. (Tuomi, 1999, 105.) 
Cognitive and autopoietic epistemologies are philosophies, which consist of views of 
interpreting knowledge. Cognitive epistemology equates knowledge only with 
explicit knowledge, i.e. knowledge is transferable, universal and objective. 
Autopoietic epistemology has different views about the input that comes from 
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outside to receiver. This input is not seen as knowledge but as data, which has to be 
interpreted and it is the main reason why knowledge cannot be directly conveyed 
from one individual to another. This means that knowledge can only be produced, 
and the only way to acquire new knowledge is to observe data and combine it with 
existing knowledge. (Koskinen 2010, 157) 
Figure 4 presentation of knowledge hierarcy. The aim is to present the fact that it 
takes time and effort to process enough data to get valuable information which then 
can be used as knowledge. The knowledge is then needed to be able to make 
intelligent choices when needed. (Tuomi, 1990, 106-107) 
 
 
Figure 4. The conventional view on the knowledge hierarchy (Tuomi, 1999, 106) 
 
To be able to do fast decisions or intelligent choices, the process is often referenced 
and simplified to OODA-loop by Boyd (Brehmer, 2005, 2-4; Fusano et al., 2011, 131). 
The phases are Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action and can be defined as in 
Figure 5, where Kokkonen (2016, 60) has adapted it to define decision making for 
cyber defense. 
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The observation of known-known threats should be quite trivial as the cyber threat 
intelligence has been made available by cyber threat intellience sharing communities 
and in most cases, there is well written documentation of how to mitigate the threat. 
In some cases correctly configured mitigation tools can detect and even mitigate the 
threat automatically. 
As Kokkonen (2016, 60) points out the OODA loop requires that own assets generate 
raw data that can be collected and analysed as surveillance information. To be able 
to identify and make decisions with unknown knowns or unknown unknowns cyber 
security threats happens, it is required that the individual person has enough 
information, intelligence or even wisdom. 
In this context a company resolving cyber security incidents is an autopoietic system 
as shown in Figure 6. Handling a cyber security incident will create a small project, 
which is a new autopoietic system and these autopoietic systems develop their own 
lives and become self-referencing in their own ways as the incidents are handled by 
the defined incident handling process and personnel. 
 
 
 
Observation Orientation 
Action Decision 
Surveillance information 
of own assets 
Analysis of the 
surveillance information 
Decision of countermeasures 
or mitigation activities 
Execution of 
countermeasures or 
mitigation activities 
Figure 5. OODA-loop in cyber defense (Kokkonen, 2016, 60) 
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When cyber security incidents are linked to each other they interact mutually. 
Incidents generate the knowledge structures of a company, and the company itself 
provides the conditions and constraints for handling the incidents. The knowledge 
production takes place at various organizational levels: at individual, incident 
handling team and company level. Producing knowledge is a recursive process, 
where there cannot be clear breaks between past, present and future. The previous 
incidents have left their traces on the later incidents, which is result of producing 
new knowledge, which is a prerequisite for an autopoietic system (Koskinen 2010, 
156). 
As knowledge management point of view, the OODA-loop forces the individual cyber 
security incident handler to gain knowledge and intelligence as cyber threat 
intelligence, which he/she can then use to observe new phenomena.  
2.3 Sharing cyber threat intelligence and knowledge 
Autopoietic epistemology defines that the only way to acquire new knowledge is to 
observe data and combine it with the existing knowledge (Koskinen 2010, 157). This 
will affect how to share cyber threat ingelligence data and how to observe it so that 
it will generate new knowledge. This issue affects when two or more people who are 
involved in when handling a cyber security incident as knowledge cannot be directly 
conveyed from one individual to another. 
Several authors have pointed out that the quality of the collected threat intelligence 
is an increasing problem (Al-Ibrahim et al. 2017; Borum, et al. 2015; Sillaber, et al.  
Individual 
autopoietic 
learning 
 
Incident handling team 
autopoietic learning 
 
Company-based 
autopoietic learning 
 
Figure 6. Autopoiesis at project-based company (Koskinen, 2010) 
19 
 
 
2016). It can be seen as a learning problem as it takes time and effort to gain 
intelligence, as shown in Figure 4. 
Cyber threat intelligence model (Mavroeidis & Bromander 2017, 2) is trying to define 
different aspects of the cyber security threat or incident. Collecting data as targets, 
IOC’s and TTP’s is carried out by all cyber security incident handlers and it might be 
shared as cyber threat intelligence e.g. as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). 
Several authors have pointed out that there are some issues when sharing cyber 
threat intelligence. The main issue is the privacy i.e. can private data be shared as 
cyber threat intelligence when handling cyber security incidents, where laws might 
restrict what can be shared (Fisk et al. 2015; Johnson et al. 2016, 12; Moihasen et al. 
2017, 5). The cyber threat intelligence should be an information asset and part of the 
risk management and cyber security management system as well.  
The problem of high quality threat intelligence needs to be solved by cyber security 
information sharing communities where trust and maturity can be evolved (Al-
Ibrahim et al. 2017; Borum et al. 2015; Sillaber et al.  2016; Zhao & White 2014). The 
trust and risks can be handled in cyber security information sharing communities as 
Kokkonen has defined (2016, 61-63). 
As knowledge sharing and learning point of view the cyber security information 
sharing community is an autopoiesis system where new knowledge is produced 
whenever a person, incident handling teams or companies receive new cyber threat 
intelligence. The quality of the threat intelligence can be improved if the received 
data is enriched by the receiver, and the receiver is willing to share his own 
observations back. 
2.4 Situation awareness and cyber security 
The OODA loop requires that the individual person is aware of the current situation. 
Even though the OODA loop has been used already for long time, Endsley (1995) was 
one of first to create theoretical foundations for situational awareness. 
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In his article, Endsley (1995, 52) points out that stress, workload, complexity and 
automation affect the situation awareness, which will eventually affect the 
effectiveness of OODA loop on individual level.  
Endsley (1995, 53-54) considered that in the worst case when automation fails, the 
users understanding how the data is processed and shown by automated systems, 
can quickly orientate to a new situation and keep up their situation awareness.  The 
users passively waiting for automated alarms, might have problems to understand 
the root cause of the alarms and will make wrong decisions. 
In cyber threat intelligence context, this means that even if it is possible to automate 
log management and analysis of logs to generate automated alarms, the persons 
handling the alarms should understand what kind of alarms the security controls are 
providing and what kind of anomalies they cannot detect. 
A decent amount of automation to lower the complexity will affect positively the 
individual level to workload and stress (Endsley, 1995, 52-53). The balance between 
situation awareness and workload needs to be optimized so that high situation 
awareness can be kept without increasing workload. 
El Sawy and Majchrzak in their article (2004) point out that when OODA loop is 
almost real time, there is a need for vigilant information systems to support decision 
making (Figure 7). While comparing definition of vigilant information systems (El 
Sawy & Majchrzak 2014, 25) to requirement specification for the situation awareness 
tools for blue teams (Lötjönen, 2017), the requirements for handling information 
from many sources i.e. data aggregation, can be considered to be the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 
Observation Orientation 
Vigilant information 
systems 
Action 
Figure 7. OODA loop with vigilant information systems 
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It can be understood so that when a user observes data, it takes time to process it 
based on autopoietic epistemology: when the first set of data is processed, the next 
set of data might be available before the user has managed to create a decision 
based on the first set of data.  
In the worst case if it takes long time to solve first cyber security incident, there 
needs to be a system to alert the user when a more critical incident has happened, so 
that the user is forced to decide which of the alerts is more critical to be solved first. 
Or on the other hand as Lötjönen (2017, 31) points out: when action is executed, it 
will change the state of the whole environment, it will not only affect the current 
situation awareness, but it might alter the system so that the projection of future is 
changed as well.  
The projection of future status according to Endsley (1995, 39) is the 3rd level of 
situation awareness. In his work he has defined that the situation awareness can be 
divided into three levels as illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The perception of elements at level 1 is where correct data needs to be identified 
and observed from the surrounding environment (Endsley 1995, 36-37), it is the first 
steps to create knowledge where unfiltered data is transformed to information (see 
Figure 4). 
Based on Koskinen (2010, 15), to gain new knowledge the observed data needs to be 
handled and combined with existing knowledge. In Endsley model (1995, 37), it is the 
SITUATION AWARENESS 
LEVEL 3: PROJECTION OF FUTURE STATUS 
LEVEL 2: COMPREHENSATION OF CURRENT SITUATION 
LEVEL 1: PERCEPTION OF ELEMENTS IN CURRENT SITUATION 
Figure 8. The situation awareness model (Endsley 1995, 35) 
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process at level 2 where the elements of the identified at level 1 are combined to 
create groups of identifiable patterns of information. It can be considered, that when 
a security control gives an alarm, the verification of the alarm’s correctness will be 
based on the comparison of the existing cyber threat intelligence and comparison of 
previous alarms to the new collected information.  
As Tuomi (1990, 106-107) points out knowledge is needed to be able to make 
intelligent choices. To be able to make intelligent choices, in OODA loop decision 
phase, it is required to understand what impacts the decision will have on the future. 
To understand what the state of the system is after each decision option, it might be 
important to understand before the decision is made what the wanted state is 
(Brehmer, 2005, 5). 
For example if it is suspected that one computer might be infected by unknown 
malware, what is the correct way to mitigate it? Or rather, what are the steps to find, 
clean and verify the infected computers and harden the whole enviromnent so that 
the malware will not spread and will not infect computers again. Eventually each 
small change is a state change in the environment as well. 
When considering the malware example, it is obvious that solving that kind of case 
might require teamwork. In learning context teamwork is an autopoietic system, 
where new knowledge is produced at individual and team level.  
The situation awareness at team level could be described that it is a perception of 
elements on level 1 and 2 at individual level and sharing it to the whole team or 
another team member at situation awareness level 2. At level 2, it can be assumed 
that both the team members or the whole team needs to have enough cyber threat 
intelligence to be able to handle the shared information of others to gain agreement 
on the current situation (Endsley, 1995, 37). The comprehension of the current 
situation is needed when decisions needs to be made and the projection of future 
status is defined. 
According to Endsley (1995, 39), the team work requires that situation awareness 
overlaps, which is illustrated in Figure 9. The team can only work together, if there is 
enough information sharing until the whole team has gained comprehension of the 
current situation. 
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Figure 9. Team situational awareness 
 
2.5 Research in human behavior and cyber security exercises 
Looking up the research conducted in cyber situation awareness field, there are not 
so many empirical studies done (Franke & Brynielsson, 2014) and even fewer 
research during cyber security exercises, even though cyber security exercises should 
be used more to collect empirical data of cyber security phenomena (Sommestad & 
Hallberg, 2012).  
While going through the list of articles reviewed by Franke and Brynielsson (2014) it 
was found out that there were not so many researches related to human behavior 
either.   
Although it was suspected that there might have been research on how security 
operation centers manage cyber threat intelligence (knowledge management), how 
they solve cyber security incidents in distributed teams (process, human or people 
management) or how situation awareness is organized (processes and tools). The 
only conclusion is that if that kind of research is carried out, it contains only such 
business-critical information, which cannot be published. 
One found research investigated work practices of network security professionals 
(Adnan et al. 2014). The authors pointed out, that even if the results look promising, 
but as they aimed to get respondents who work with security related tasks more 
than 50% of their daily work, the goal of the research was not reached. Outcome of 
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the research was a generic process description where incident detection, incident 
analysis and incident mitigation were verified to be common step by step process. 
Another interesting research found was a Ph.D. Thesis by Sørensen (2012). It was an 
experimental study where the shared situation awareness was compared to 
distributed situation awareness of command and control teams. The aim was to 
identify how different organization structures affects communication, situation 
awareness and performance of the organization.  In the context of cyber security 
exercise, Sørensen’s thesis could be used to create different kinds of organization 
and team setups for the exercises. 
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3 Research 
In the thesis, the cyber threat intelligence sharing in full live cyber security exercise 
between defender teams aka blue teams (BT) is studied. The aim is to understand 
what kind of cyber threat intelligence is collected and how it is used and shared 
between BTs to mitigate cyber security threats and handle the cyber security 
incidents. The research also focuses onto gaining insights on the tools used and how 
the tools are used for situation awareness during the exercise. 
3.1 Research methodology 
As stated by Franke and Brynielsson (2014) and Sommestad and Hallberg (2012) 
empirical research is a suitable research method to be used in cyber security 
exercises. As noted in previous chapter, the cyber security exercises have not been 
used as a basis for academic research, hence, a multi-method approach was selected. 
A case study approach was selected, due to the aim to describe what was observed 
in exercise context and explain cause-and-effect phenomena in the exercise 
(Weerakkody & Niranjala, 2015, 253). 
For this purpose, cyber security exercise course at JAMK University of Applied 
sciences is appropriate as a case study topic, as the environment and situation of the 
exercise is and can be controlled by White Team (WT).  
On the other hand, to get more detailed knowledge of situation awareness and cyber 
threat intelligence, survey research was selected as the second method to get 
quantitative and qualitative information on the use of different tools for situation 
awareness and for handling and sharing cyber threat intelligence. 
3.2 Collecting and sharing cyber threat intelligence 
To be able to analyze the collected and shared cyber threat intelligence defined goals 
need to defined goals for the phenomenon in cyber security exercise context. These 
goals can be defined using examples based on the WT and Red Team (RT) attack 
blueprints. 
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Goal 1: for each cyber security incident BTs should collect source and destination 
information as atomic indicators 
For each RT attack scenario, there was always a defined target and, in most cases, 
some identifiable source information as well. For example, the RT attack blueprint 
CSE111 (Simola & Koskinen 2018), contains detailed information that the attack 
target is the web application of one BT, and source is a spoofed IPv4 address from 
another BT IPv4 public address space. 
The goal 1 for the cyber security exercise is that all BTs should try to collect correct 
source and target information to all detected events as detailed atomic indicators as 
possible. As in sharing community the quality of atomic indicators is in important role 
(Al-Ibrahim et al. 2017). 
Goal 2: BTs should try to collect any tool, malware, vulnerability or attack pattern 
information 
If the security controls are correctly configured, they can in some cases detect the 
used tool for the RT attack. For example, in CSE312 (Ruusupiha, 2018), the RT attack 
uses SQLMAP to open SQL shell used to create a new administrator account. The 
creation of an unknown process should be able to be detected, in this case the attack 
pattern including the vulnerable component and what was done can be detected. 
On the other hand, Appendix 13 contains an example of CVE news. The handling of 
this kind information requires that BT has detected, analyzed and defined if it needs 
some actions or not by the BT. The CVE might or might not reveal some valid 
information which might be used by RT in some of their attack blueprints. 
Goal 2 is to verify how well members of BTs understand the basic terminology of 
cyber threat intelligence focusing on what kind of cyber threat intelligence is 
collected by the teams. 
Goal 3: BTs should try to identify threat actors 
The WT801 scenario (Hyytiäinen, 2018) contains a definition for an imaginary threat 
actor. BTs need to collect the information related to all identified threat actors. They 
might be able to verify if the defined threat actor in WT801 (Hyytiäinen, 2018) is 
played by WT or RT. 
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In the planned scenario context, BTs should try to identify at least some information 
related to threat actors, their identity, motivation or goals. There is a risk that the 
BTs does not have either enough resources to gather and handle the cyber threat 
intelligence or it does not have an efficient process to do it. 
Goal 4: BTs should share cyber threat intelligence in controlled manner 
To be able to effectively mitigate cyber security incidents, the BTs should share the 
collected cyber threat intelligence to another BT. The aim is to detect if the members 
of BTs will create cyber security sharing communities as expected by Kokkonen 
(2016, 64) and Zhao and White (2014). 
Goal 5: BTs should try to mitigate any threat using collected or received cyber threat 
intelligence 
The goal is to investigate if one BT uses cyber threat intelligence received from 
another BT to mitigate a threat. This goal affects the planning of the time table so 
that there is enough time for BTs to collect, analyze and share the cyber threat 
intelligence. If the BTs are able to collect high quality IOCs (Goals 1 and 2) and are 
able to create sharing communities (Goal 4), it should be possible to verify if the 
shared cyber threat intelligence is used to mitigate a threat. 
It will depend on the individual level how fast a BT member can process and identify 
the new data to get valuable information. The autopoietic epistemology defines that 
it is a learning process to handle the gathered data which then can be used as 
knowledge to make decisions when to mitigate cyber security threats.  At individual 
level identifying and mitigating a threat requires that the OODA loop is efficient, 
however, if it takes a long time to process the gathered unfiltered data into 
meaningful information, it might not be possible to identify the atomic indicators 
that might be needed to make the decision on how to mitigate the threat. 
In knowledge hierarchy point of view, Figure 4, the aim of goal 1, goal 2 and goal 3 is 
that the BT member understands the unfiltered data and managed to create a 
meaningful information from it e.g. IPv4 address, which then can be shared as 
knowledge, e.g. malicious IPv4 address, to another team member or another team. 
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The aim of the cyber security exercise is to train participants to detect and analyze 
cyber attacks, which means that participants gains valuable experience, knowledge 
how to detect malicious activity and intelligence how to mitigate the threat. In 
knowledge hierarchy point of view, Figure 4, wisdom is gained when participants can 
make use of knowledge and intelligence to detect unknown threat and mitigate it in 
an intelligent way. 
3.3 Research questions 
3.3.1 Situation awareness 
In this thesis, the aim is to gain information on the use of different tools of current 
exercise environment during cyber security exercise as situational awareness tools. 
The aim is to understand how an individual BT member uses different tools for 
situational awareness, which is a research question also identified by Lötjönen in his 
thesis (2017, 64). 
3.3.2 Cyber threat intelligence 
In cyber threat intelligence context, the aim is to find out answers to following topics 
Q1: How are the BTs are organizing the collection, analysis and handling of cyber 
threat intelligence? 
The aim is to have insights in what kind of organization structures and 
processes BTs have, to be able to design better exercises in future. 
Q2: What kind of cyber threat intelligence sharing groups will be created and seen 
during the exercise? 
As described in goal 4, there should be cyber threat intelligence sharing 
groups.  
Q3: Does the controlled sharing of cyber threat intelligence with provided tools 
improve the situation awareness? 
As this is one of the first empirical researches on this phenomenon 
area, the aim is to verify if the planned research setup works in the 
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research field i.e. did the planned research setup improved the 
situation awareness if the cyber threat intelligence was shared with 
provided tools? 
Q4: Was the cyber threat intelligence enriched by sharing community? 
As Al-Ibrahim (et al. 2017) points out, the quality of the threat 
intelligence is an increasing problem and if there is a need for cyber 
threat intelligence sharing community, it is expected that all members 
of the community are working towards same goal, i.e. to enrich and 
improve the quality of shared cyber threat intelligence. 
3.4 Risks 
To be able to get enough research data, BTs will have total freedom e.g. to organize 
their team structure and their processes; because of this, following risks have been 
identified: 
R1: BTs does not have dedicated resources for handling cyber threat intelligence 
BTs will get information that it is required for them to organize the 
collecting, handling and sharing cyber threat intelligence as a part of 
exercise. They will be told that all collected and shared cyber threat 
intelligence can be used for hardening the environments. 
R2: The persons who work with cyber threat intelligence does not have enough 
knowledge of it 
It can be assumed that all participants of the course have at least some 
basic understanding of cyber threat intelligence. In this case how the 
team handles the problem is one research question itself. 
R3: There is not enough time to do collect, analyze, share and enrich the cyber threat 
intelligence 
As the WT is controlling the game, it can be assumed that the WT will 
control the speed of the game so that there is enough time for cyber 
threat intelligence.  
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However, it is also a valid research result that in a live cyber security exercise BTs 
might not have enough resources, knowledge or time to collect, analyze and share 
cyber threat intelligence. The research results will affect and give hints how to 
organize cyber security exercises in future.  
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4 Technical cyber security exercise setup 
4.1 Techical Cyber Security Exercise Course 
The research was conducted during a cyber security exercise course in spring 2018 
(Cyber Security Exercise YIIP3400, 2018; Implementation of a Cyber Exercise 
TTKW0320, 2018), with 80 participants devided into six team as described in Table 1. 
Each team contains Master’s and Bachelor’s degree students. 4 master degree 
students were from Jyväskylä University, rest were from JAMK University of Applied 
Sciences. All Master’s degree students are specalizing to cyber security. Bachelor’s 
degree students were from JAMK and they specialized in cyber security. Roughly 10 
JAMK teachers and IT personnell were used during exercise as advisors or as a 
members of green team (GT), to help with the technical RGCE environment. 
Table 1. Exercise team setup 
Team Master degree 
students 
Bachelor degree 
students 
Total 
White Team (WT) 8 8 16 
Red Team (RT) 8 7 15 
YBANK 5 8 13 
YSOC 4 8 12 
YSTORE 4 8 12 
YSHOP 4 8 12 
Total 33 47 80 
  
Most of the Master’s degree students had a long work history from different kind of 
information technology companies containing work history related to cyber security 
as well. The Bachelor’s degree students were selected to this course only if they had 
already passed a selected set of cyber security courses. 
The technical cyber security exercise has several course objectives. The aim was to 
train students to (Lötjönen et al. 2018) 
• Participate and contribute in planning, execution and review phases of Cyber 
Security Exercise 
• Detect and analyze a subset of cyber attacks in a partially unknown ICT-environment 
and assess the risk levels of the threats for business 
• Analyze technical functions of the different attack vectors, identify the different 
threat actors and their effect on business continuity  
• Handle cyber security incident using planned processes and procedures 
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• Plan a remediation plan and preventative measures (Assess, countermeasure and 
mitigation of those cyber attacks) 
• Recognize, plan and execute threats, attack vectors and methods in fictional scenario 
• Conduct teamwork 
4.2 Game controlling teams 
The game was controlled by the WT and the RT was the cyber conflict generation 
organisation. WT together with the RT created the fictional background story for the 
exercise. RT designed the cyber security events and the detailed technical attack 
blueprints based on the background scenario.  
WT had the main responsibility for creating overall plans and time schedules for the 
exercise. WT also controlled every aspect of the exercise such as timings when and 
where something will happen,  where as RT was the team to execute the technical 
cyber security attacks when requested by WT. 
4.2.1 White Team 
Figure 10 shows WT organisation structure where the numbers present the amount 
of persons. The aim of the organisation was to create clear communication flow 
between exercise management and between needed functionalities. 
 
Figure 10. White Team organization structure 
The role of the social media team was to handle and conrol the social media events 
of the WT and follow up different social media platforms in the exercise.  During the 
exersice they publishedd news and ther social media topics related to the RT attack 
blueprints. 
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The role of the blue team management was to handle and control all issues related 
to the BTs. For example the blue team game controllers followed up how BTs reacted 
to the RT technical attacks. One of the main tasks was to be an employee or an 
customer of the BT, to verify that the technical business environment of BT was 
working through out the exercise. If problems were detected,  they contacted BT 
helpdesk as an employee or the issues were discussed in social media as a customer. 
RT management was to controll the exercise with the exercise lead. The main task 
was to control when RT can start the next attack scenario.  RT management needed 
info from other WT teams how well blue teams were able to detect the running 
attack scenarios. The RT management controlled that the BTs had enough time to 
detect the attacks, collect the necessary information and carry out the mitigation 
tasks. 
WT also played the role of national level cyber security center (CSC) sharing and 
collecting cyber threat intelligence during the exercise. The CSC team was 
responsible for a follow up what cyber threat intelligence was gathered and shared 
by BTs during the excersice. Also, CSC had own scenario related to cyber threat 
intelligence. The aim of the scenario was to gather information on how BTs collected, 
analyzed and shared the cyber threat intelligence. 
4.2.2 Red Team 
Figure 11 shows the structure of the RT organization. In the defined game scenario, 
there was need for different kind of threat actors. The script kiddie type of actor, 
team 1, trying to get attention to themselves within any means available. The 
anonymous will not try to hide; the aim was that their attack scenarios should be 
easily detected by BTs, and they were used to generate distractions to hide other 
ongoing technical attacks of other two teams. 
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Figure 11. RT organization structure 
Team 2, RUS8, represent a crime as a service threat actor. They had all the tools and 
knowledge available to most paying customers, i.e. for the Team 3 (TAO-007). Team 
3 was a national level ATP-group, which wanted to affect in political and economical 
way to the overall scenario. For example, team 2 was responsible to get a persistent 
command and control channel to BTs technical environment, which was then used by 
Team 3 for advanced attacks such as getting data out from databases. 
4.3 Blue Teams 
The four BTs (YBANK, YSOC, YSTORE and YSHOP) had business relations as described 
in Figure 12. YSTORE and YSHOP are web shops selling items to consumer market. 
They were  competitiors as they tried to focus on the same market area with the 
same kind of item portfolio.  YBANK was a banking company and it offfered online 
and traditional banking services to private and corporate customers like YSTORE and 
YSHOP. YSTORE and YSHOP used YBANK provided online payment services and credit 
card payment services. 
 
35 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Exercise company relationships 
 
YSOC was a private security operation center providing information security solutions 
to financial institutions, commercial companies and government agencies (YSOC Blue 
Team 2018, 2). YSOC had business relations between YSTORE and YSOP. YSOC 
provided e.g. centralized log-monitoring and analyzing services, secure DNS services 
and consultation for investigation and mitigation of cyber security incidents. 
The cyber threat intelligence sharing community  for the exercise is defined in Figure 
13. CSC was sharing and collecting cyber threat intelligence during the exercise. CSC 
was sharing information with all companies. 
 
Figure 13. Cyber threat intelligence sharing community 
YBANK had their own security operation center, so they were sharing directly with 
CSC. As YSOC provided solutions to YSTORE and YSHOP, they could share cyber threat 
intelligence between them as well. 
In this scenario with YSTORE and YSHOP competitors, YSOC needed to consider what 
kind of threat intelligence they could use when resolving YSTORE and YSHOP cyber 
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security incidents. Were they allowed to use threat intelligence received from 
YSTORE to resolve YSHOP security incidents? YSTORE and YSHOP should have agreed 
with YSOC how to handle the shared information and how to classify the private and 
public information correctly. 
All BTs had time to get used to their own infrastructure. The first step was to analyze 
the team’s own infrastructure and create business models, business plans and risk 
management plans. The second step was to create an organization structure to the 
team and define communication and incident management plan for the team. Figure 
14 shows as an example of YSHOP organization structure (YSHOP Blue Team, 2018), 
where management was run by Master’s degree students and the technical team 
was filled with Bachelor’s degree students. 
 
 
Figure 14. YSHOP organization structure (YSHOP Blue Team, 2018) 
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The major challenge for BTs was to have a communication plan, incident 
management process and incident response management organization as most of 
the Bachelor’s degree students had no work experience of them. The communication 
plan should describe how the organization would be communicating during the 
exercise including internal and external communication, so that all members of the 
team would have enough information for maintaining the situation awareness during 
the exercise. 
Figure 15 shows the YSTORE and their defined organization structure with the main 
communication flow. YSTORE had also defined who the main responsible to 
communicate with YSOC was and what kinds of roles were expected from WT during 
the exercise. (YSTORE Blue Team, 2018) 
In addition, WT defined that whenever BT has a need to communicate for example to 
governmental authority (e.g. police), business partner (e.g. network operator) or to 
an employee (who is not in their team), BT should contact WT and WT play the 
needed. 
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Figure 15. YSTORE organization with main communication flow (YSTORE Blue Team, 
2018) 
YSOC prepared a very detailed incident management process (see process figure in 
Appendix 3), because they had business agreements with YSHOP and YSTORE.  YSOC 
had also a set of security controls, which generated security alerts as incidents 
directly to their incident management system. 
4.4 Exercise environment 
The Realistic Global Cyber Range (RGCE) of JYVSECTEC in JAMK, can be considered as 
mini internet, which contains realistic functions e.g. realistic name service 
architecture, controlled update and software repositories for various operating 
systems and several industry specific organizations with a complete set of business 
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services. To mimic the real internet, RGCE has several public services as well like 
news site, social media platforms and email services. (Vatanen et al. 2017, 3-6) 
As the RGCE is an isolated environment it is a safe environment to test different 
kinds of cyber-attack scenarios to simulate threat actor behavior, their tactics, 
techniques and procedures (Vatanen et al. 2017, 4). 
For communication, a chat application was used so that there was a separate chat 
room (channel) for WT to manage the whole exercise and separated chat rooms for 
each other team which the team can use it for private discussions, but also to 
communicate with WT privately. 
To support making notes during the exercise, a Wiki based application (Collab) was 
provided for each team. From the chat application, it was possible with simple 
commands to create wiki pages when something was needed to be documented for 
further use. 
BTs could use e-mails or provided VoIP phones to communicate to another BT. 
However, all VoIP communication should be documented to Wiki, so that it could be 
used when analyzing the exercise.   
BTs were also encouraged to use VoIP to communicate with WT, when other 
communication methods did not reach the needed correct contacts. In addition, WT 
could use VoIP to contact BT as a customer, an employee, a business partner, a 
journalist etc., when it was expedient to give a hint for the BT that there might be an 
ongoing RT attack. 
4.5 MISP – Open Source Threat Intelligence Platform 
As a part of the research the aim was to investigate how cyber threat intelligence is 
collected, analyzed and shared, there was a need to select appropriate tool for BTs. 
One of the choices: MISP had already presented by Lötjönen on his Master’s thesis 
(2017, 41-42) as also shown on Figure 1. One of first MISP pilot studies at JAMK was 
made by the author (Hyytiäinen et al., 2015). 
MISP is an open source threat intelligence platform currently community-driven 
project lead by the community of users. The project itself is co-financed by the 
40 
 
 
European Union and the lead developers works for CIRCL (Computer Incident 
Response Center Luxembourg) (MISP Project 2018). 
Several other tools were considered however, when following requirements were 
considered, only MISP fulfilled them all (not in particular order): 
1) Open source 
2) User base should be large enough 
3) Software should be frequently updated 
4) Fast responsive support community 
5) Solid and stable performance, so that users can use it 
6) Easy to configure: users, user roles, organizations 
7) Real-time replication between servers 
8) As easy to use as the Wiki platform and the incident management system 
BTs has 
9) Tool should use the common terminology of cyber threat intelligence 
model (Mavroeidis & Bromander 2017) 
10) Support for different kinds of IOCs  
 
The support for the IOC’s is one of the strengths and at the same time one of the 
weakness points of MISP. A cyber security incident or observation is entered to MISP 
as an event. An Event is a collection of attributes, IOCs. (MISP Project 2018, 27-30) 
When entering an attribute, user needs to select category of the attribute and then 
more detailed type for it. Currently there are 16 categories and 134 different types 
(MISP Project 2018, 158-171). The project has documentation what category and 
type combination are allowed, however, an optimal way to the end user of MISP is 
not currently shown. As this was noticed during the preparation time, some example 
events were made in MISP which were visible to all users of MISP (for example, 
Appendix 10 and Appendix 11). 
When entering attributes, MISP also supports objects and templates. For the 
exercise, a small set of default objects were enabled (Figure 16). The default objects 
are designed so that they give a set of default attributes which describes the object 
in a meaningful way.  
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Figure 16. Small set of MISP object categories 
 
The objects are designed so that they contain a minimal number of mandatory 
attributes (Figure 17) and help text aiding the user to fill in the needed data. 
 
Figure 17. MISP DDOS object template 
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The original plan was to use MISP so that each BT would have their own MISP server. 
That setup would place an opportunity for RT to try to compromise the integrity, 
availability and confidentiality of the cyber threat intelligence on the MISP server.  
That setup was ignored, as the primary research goal was to identify what kind of 
cyber threat intelligence was collected, analyzed and shared. It was considered that if 
the MISP server is compromised, BTs might not trust the shared data and eventually 
the MISP might not be used at all during the exercise. The final setup contained only 
one MISP server, which was stated to be out of the game system. 
During the preparation phase, all members of BTs were given basic training of MISP. 
There were 3 test sessions, which were used to train out of game communication, 
out of game tools like the chat, wiki platform and MISP. 
The author was prepared for giving advanced training of MISP to the users selected 
by BTs to have the responsibility to collect, analyze and share cyber threat 
intelligence. Only one member of YSOC wanted to have advanced MISP training, 
which was held one day before the exercise. 
As a side note, while preparing to the exercise the author found one bug in MISP, 
one possible bug, which is not yet confirmed and created five improvement 
proposals for the MISP project. 
4.6 Exercise events 
Table 2 contains the list of events which should have been identified by the BTs. RT 
had their own attack scenarios targeting BTs. WT had a set of events that were not 
targeted to one organization rather to all of them, so that the collecting, analyzing 
and sharing cyber threat intelligence could be investigated.  
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Table 2. Exercise events 
Event YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE Cyber threat 
intelligence 
Appendix 
RT attack 
scenario 
15 16 13 15 All  
ATP simulator 1 1 1 1 Indicators of 
compromise 
 
MISP shared 
events 
11 13 12 13 Identity, atomic 
indicators, 
infrastructure, 
malware 
10,11 
CNN news 4 4 4 4 Identity, 
vulnerabilities 
12,13 
Telia OSINT 
emails 
7 1 6 1 Vulnerabilities, 
infrastructure 
14 
Youtube.com 1 0 0 0 Identity, target  
pastebin.com 4 4 4 4 Malware, indicators 
of compromise 
15 
gitlab.com 1 1 1 1 Identity, target, 
tools 
16 
imgr.com 5 5 6 5 Identity, target, 
motivation 
17 
Suspicious 
twitter 
accounts 
3 3 3 3 Identity, target, 
motivation 
18 
Suspicious 
bank accounts 
1 0 0 0 Identity 19 
Total events 52 45 48 43   
 
RT attacks contained e.g. different kinds of denial of service attacks, email phishing 
attacks and email malware distribution attacks. RT also used a known vulnerability in 
WordPress to gain access to the intranet and a known vulnerability in the web shop 
application used by YSTORE and YSHOP to get access to customer information. 
As WT had access to employee workstations, it was considered that a simple tool, in 
this case Nextron Systems APT Simulator (White Team, 2018, 18) was be used to 
simulate adversary activities.  For example, it could be used to create noise to 
distract blue teams when needed. 
While investigating the open source threat intelligence feeds in MISP, the appendices 
4-9 were created based on the idea of those feeds. Examples of the data distributed 
in the game environment are on the described appendix pages. 
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While preparing for the exercise, it was noticed that the YBANK contained some user 
accounts from the previous exercise (2017). The account was used for a money 
laundry operation, so some threat intelligence was published early on during the 
preparation time (see Appendix 10 and Appendix 19).  
4.7 Processes and tools in the exercise 
WT decided early on that it is not WTs role to define what kind of organization 
structure each BT will have or what kind of business processes BTs will create. The 
only requirement was that BTs needs to have efficient communication process with 
WT. 
During the planning phase of the exercise, there was enough time to learn to use the 
provided tools. In the planning phase, there was a two-days training session where 
teams were learning how to use their own environment but also how to use out of 
game tools and communication systems i.e. chat tools, wiki platform and MISP.  
Based on the two-days training session, it was also requested that two extra training 
sessions were required to learn the efficient processes not only to communicate with 
WT but to learn how to use the provided tools in an efficient way. 
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5 Research results 
This chapter provides an analysis of the exercise. The aim is not to focus on how well 
BTs detected and mitigate the threats, rather to analyze the situation awareness of 
the BTs and to understand what kind of cyber threat intelligence was collected, how 
it was used and shared during the exercise. The aim was to identify how the 
individuals, or the organizations are functioning in cyber exercise while maintaining 
the situation awareness.  
5.1 Survey information 
Appendix 1 survey was sent to all employees of each BT (n=49), the results was 
received from 37 persons as shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Survey 1 respond rate 
Survey 1 Surveys 
send 
Responds 
received 
YBANK 13 10 
YSOC 12 8 
YSTORE 12 11 
YSHOP 12 8 
Total 49 37 
 
Appendix 2 survey was sent to all employees of each BT, who logged into MISP 
during the exercise and used it even for a short period of time; results was received 
from 11 persons as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Survey 2 respond rate 
Survey 2 Surveys 
send 
Responds 
received 
YBANK 4 2 
YSOC 4 2 
YSTORE 4 3 
YSHOP 4 4 
Total 16 11 
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5.2 Event detection 
The exercise was executed during two days: on day 1 from 10:00 till 17:30 and on 
day 2 from 9:00 till 12:00. The aim was that the during the day one the speed of the 
exercise was slower so that BTs could orientate to the exercise and do adjustments 
for their processes if needed. The focus of the day one was on detecting malicious 
activity and to collect and analyze cyber threat intelligence as it was planned so that 
any collected cyber threat intelligence could be used when BTs were permitted to do 
hardenings to their environments after the day one. For example, if a BT detected 
malicious IPv4 addresses or domain names, they could use that information to detect 
or even block the traffic in security controls such as firewalls. 
It can be seen on Table 5, that in the second day, the schedule was much tighter and 
in much shorter time almost the same number of RT events were executed. Some of 
the RT events was planned so that they were already executed against some BT on 
day one but executed against another BT on day two. As RT was learning by doing, 
the time for preparations and executing the attacks on day 2 was much shorter than 
on day 1. 
Table 5. Events in the exercise split by exercise day 
 Exercise day 1 (9:00-17:30) Exercise day 2 (9:00-12:00) 
BT RT events WT events RT events WT events 
YBANK 7 7 8 9 
YSHOP 10 5 6 8 
YSOC 8 6 5 9 
YSTORE 9 5 6 8 
TOTAL 34 23 24 36 
 
Table 6 is filled with the data based on the MISP events, created wiki pages and 
based on the tickets found in the incident management system of the BTs. It is 
obvious that only one of the BT has focused on or had dedicated resources to collect 
cyber threat intelligence, which was related to threat intelligence scenarios played by 
the WT. 
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Table 6. Detected events 
Event YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE Detected cyber 
threat intelligence 
RT attack scenario 8 8 7 7  
ATP simulator 0 0 0 1 malware 
MISP shared events 0 1 1 0 Infrastructure 
CNN news 0 0 1 2 Identity, 
vulnerabilities 
Telia OSINT emails 2 1 1 1 Vulnerabilities, 
infrastructure 
youtube.com 0 0 1 0 Target 
pastebin.com 0 0 4 0 Malware 
gitlab.com 0 0 1 0 Tools 
imgr.com 0 0 6 0 Identity, target  
Suspicious twitter accounts 0 0 2 0 Identity, target, 
motivation 
Suspicious bank accounts 0 0 0 0 - 
Total detected events 10 10 24 11  
 
On the other hand, the survey question (Appendix 1, question 6) results are show 
that 86.5% of the responders considered that they were collecting cyber threat 
intelligence (Table 7). Based on the collected data, it cannot be known if BTs 
detected the data but did not analyze and store it for future use. 
Table 7. Did you collect cyber threat intelligence during the exercise? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 32 86.5% 10 7 6 9 
No 5 13.5% 0 1 2 2 
 
5.3 Situation awareness 
Based on the survey question 4 (Table 8) in Appendix 1, there were totally 10 
different kinds of methods used for maintaining situation awareness. The discussion 
within team - either spoken or in chat - can be considered the most used method and 
it shows that employees are discussing and sharing information between each other.  
 
 
Table 8. What tools did you use for maintaining your situation awareness? 
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N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Discussion in team 36 97.3% 10 8 7 11 
Incident management tools 34 91.89% 9 7 8 10 
Social media 30 81.08% 10 7 4 9 
Logs or log management 
systems 
28 75.68% 10 5 8 5 
Discussion in chat 26 70.27% 9 7 5 5 
MISP 11 29.73% 4 2 3 2 
phone 3 8.10% 0 0 2 0 
email 2 5.41% 0 0 1 1 
wiki 1 2.7% 0 0 0 1 
monitoring tools 1 2.7% 0 0 0 1 
 
In Table 8 can also be seen that participants were using the provided incident 
management tools with logs or log management systems to maintain their situation 
awareness as well. By looking up the data in the incident management systems, 
Table 9, it can be seen that each BT was able also handle their incidents according to 
their processes during the exercise. Each team also used the provided wiki to handle 
incidents. Those events are the ones they considered important to report to WT as 
well. 
Table 9. Tickets in incident management systems 
Team Open 
tickets 
Closed 
tickets 
Total amount 
tickets 
Wiki events 
YBANK 3 33 36 25 
YSHOP 9 41 55 23 
YSOC 21 54 75 51 
YSTORE 7 12 19 27 
 
As BTs can be compared, the amount of YSTORE tickets seems to be very low 
compared to any other BTs. It can be only assumed that YSOC handle most of the 
cases related to YSTORE and there were not so many things to do by themselves. 
Although in that case, they should have had enough time to collect cyber threat 
intelligence from the game environment. 
The most important situation awareness tools can be seen in Table 10. The results 
for Appendix 1, question 3 were weighted so that the most important tool was given 
weight 7 and the least important 1 and each team contained the same number of 
employees, 10 in this case. 
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Table 10. Weighted situation awareness tools used by BT 
Tool YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE TOTAL 
Logs or log management tools 48 43 58 48 197 
Discussion in team 49 41 46 46 182 
Incident management tools 46 38 50 46 180 
Discussion in chat 47 44 44 39 174 
MISP 41 46 39 45 171 
Social media 32 39 34 42 147 
phone 4 0 15 0 19 
email 0 0 9 2 11 
wiki 0 0 0 5 5 
monitoring 0 0 0 5 5 
 
It could be considered that on level 1 of Endsley (1995, 36) situation awareness 
model, the logs and log management tools are the important ones on the individual 
level when creating perception of the elements in a current situation, the detailed 
pieces of data gathered from different systems.  
Monitoring can be also considered one of the basic methods to observe current 
situation as well. From a respondent’s point of view, it can be considered that the 
respondents considered logs and log management tools to contain monitoring 
functionality as well as only one of the respondents mentioned monitoring as 
another meaningful method. 
On team level situation awareness level 2 (Endsley 1995, 37), the discussion in team, 
incident management tools and discussion in chat were the tools and methods to 
create comprehension of the current situation. 
In Table 10, the MISP and social media represent the information that was received 
or collected from outside world. It can be considered that it was used for creating 
perception of the current situation of the whole exercise world at level 1 situation 
awareness (Endsley 1995, 36).  
One question remains if Table 10 and Table 6 are compared, what information was 
seen on the social media, however, the detection itself was not logged or the 
information was not captured and stored for future use? 
YSOC, YSTORE and YSHOP had incident management systems tightly coupled so that 
the incident management handler in YSOC could directly send a ticket, question or 
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answer from their own incident management system to YSTORE or YSHOP and vice 
versa. As information was needed to be changed between BTs, it can be concluded 
that incident management tools, MISP, email, phone were used at level 2 situation 
awareness level when creating comprehension of the current situation between BTs. 
There were 79 phone calls during the exercise (Table 11; White Team, 2018), 34 
between YSOC, YSHOP and YSTORE. The question arises if YSOC thought those 34 
phone calls were important for maintaining situation awareness, why did YSHOP and 
YSTORE not? There was no documentation received from BTs what kind of 
information was shared during the phone calls. 
Table 11. Phone call statistics from the exercise (White Team, 2018) 
 To: WT YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE TOTAL 
From:        
RT   2    2 
WT   4 4 2 2 12 
YBANK  2  2 2  6 
YSHOP  1 3 1 5  10 
YSOC  11 2 15  17 45 
YSTORE  2   2  4 
TOTAL  16 11 22 11 19 79 
 
5.4 Cyber threat intelligence 
To be able to collect and understand the cyber threat intelligence, basic knowledge 
of different terms is required. It was assumed that the employees collecting cyber 
threat intelligence or those employees using MISP would have decent knowledge of 
these terms. In Figure 18 there is the data of the second survey, Appendix 2, 
question 13, the respondents were able to choose values between 1-5 (1: don't 
understand at all, 5: I'm an expert on this topic). 
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Figure 18. Appendix 2, question 13 results 
 
Based on Figure 18, it seems that the respondents of survey 2 have difficulties to 
understand the difference between atomic indicator and indicators of compromise, 
Average value=3,1 
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which will eventually have a big impact to what kind of cyber threat intelligence was 
shared between BTs. Nevertheless, the overall understanding of different terms 
seemed to be at a good level.  
5.4.1 Collecting cyber threat intelligence 
With survey 1, question 6 (Table 12) and 9 (Table 13), the aim was to identify if the 
members of the BTs are collecting or if they identified and knew that their company 
is collecting the cyber threat intelligence.  
Table 12. Did you collect cyber threat intelligence during exercise? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 32 87% 10 7 6 9 
No 5 13% 0 1 2 2 
 
Table 13. Did your company collect cyber threat intelligence during exercise? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 34 92% 8 8 8 10 
No 0 0% 0 0 0 0 
Don’t know 3 8% 2 0 0 1 
 
Based on Table 12 and Table 13, all members of the YSOC and YSHOP knew that the 
whole team is collecting cyber threat intelligence, even those who considered that 
they were not involved in collecting it them self.  
On the other hand, only one member of the YSTORE was not sure whether their 
company collected any cyber threat intelligence at all. Either it is a failure of team 
organization and communication or the concept of cyber threat intelligence is not 
clear to that member. 
Two members of YBANK answered “Don’t know”. This is slightly problematic as it can 
be assumed that in a normal case in the Table 13, there should be the same amount 
of yes answers or more yes answers than in Table 12. Either one is not collecting 
cyber threat intelligence, but one knows that someone is doing it in the team. What 
might cause “Don’t know” answer? Is it because one is collecting, but one’s team 
members do not know that one is?   
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In survey 2, question 2 (Figure 19), the choice 0-5 was given to respondents to define 
how difficult it was to collect cyber threat intelligence during the exercise, the mean 
value is 2.45 (scale 0: very easy, 5: very hard).  
 
 
Figure 19. How difficult was it to collect cyber threat intelligence during the exercise? 
Therefore, even if the collecting the cyber threat intelligence was considered 
somewhat easy, the amount of collected cyber threat intelligence should have been 
much more than what was found in the game environment.  
There are examples of threat intelligence, for e.g. a suspicious or malicious IPv4 
addresses detected by YSTORE. The information was not shared using provided the 
tools, MISP in this case, although it was stored into YSTORE incident management 
system (Figure 20) and stored to a wiki page as well.  
 
Figure 20. YSTORE detected malicious IPv4 address 
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5.4.2 Analyzing cyber threat intelligence 
The aim of the survey 2 question 3: “How difficult was it to analyze the collected 
cyber threat intelligence during exercise?” was to compare with the survey 2 
question 2, if the respondents considered that the data they collected was 
understandable and easy to analyze. Figure 21, the choice 0-5 was given to 
respondents to define how difficult it was to analyze cyber threat intelligence during 
the exercise, the mean value being 3.09 (scale 0: very easy, 5: very hard). It seems 
that the respondents managed to collect some data and data was not too difficult to 
analyze. 
 
Figure 21. How difficult was it to analyze the collected cyber threat intelligence 
during the exercise? 
All respondents to the survey 2 (Appendix 2) question 4, discussed with their own 
team member when collecting and analyzing the cyber threat intelligence, however, 
only one discussed it with someone else, from another BT, survey 2 question 5 (Table 
14). 
Table 14. Survey 2, data of questions 4 and 5 
Question Yes No 
4. Did you discuss the collected cyber threat intelligence with your 
team member when analyzing it? 
11 0 
5. Did you discuss with someone else the collected cyber threat 
intelligence when analyzing it? I.e. with someone else in another 
company? 
1 10 
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It was thought that during the exercise the threat analysts will create their own 
group of experts sharing and discussing the collected and shared cyber threat 
intelligence, however, based on the survey 2 questions 4-7, it is not so obvious (Table 
14 and Table 15). Even though there might be small group of three people but based 
on the data collected from the game environment, the existence of this group could 
not be verified. 
Table 15. Survey 2, data of questions 6 and 7 
Question Yes No 
6. When you shared cyber threat intelligence to another company, 
did you get any feedback or questions about it from their experts? 
3 8 
7. When you received cyber threat intelligence from another 
company, did you give any feedback or questions about it to their 
experts? 
3 8 
 
5.4.3 Sharing cyber threat intelligence 
The aim of survey 1 question 9 was to give more information how the teams are 
handling the cyber threat intelligence. Table 16 supports the fact that the teams 
communicated during the exercise and the cyber threat intelligence was shared 
inside the team. It was assumed that even though a member might not be involved 
directly to collecting cyber threat intelligence (Table 12), he/she was involved in 
sharing and handling it and knew what other team members are doing. 
Table 16. Did you share cyber threat intelligence during exercise in your company to 
your co-workers? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 36 97% 10 7 8 11 
No 1 3% 0 1 0 0 
 
The aim of the survey 1 question 10 (Table 17) was to verify that the blue teams had 
planned who was responsible to share cyber threat intelligence to another BTs.  
YSOC is an exception here, as they had customer relationships to YSTORE and YSHOP, 
so eventually more team members were required to handle those business 
relationships. Based on Table 17, it can be verified that the sharing was a controlled 
by the teams and it was done just by a small set of employees. 
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Table 17. Did you share cyber threat intelligence during exercise to other companies? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 12 32% 2 2 5 3 
No 25 68% 8 6 3 8 
 
Even though the BTs were small teams, there seems to be lack of communication or 
lack of knowledge what each team member was doing during exercise. Based on the 
survey 1 question 11 (Table 18), it can be assumed that even though there was 
communication in the teams (Table 8), in some teams all members did not know 
what the other member was doing. In YBANK 40% and YSHOP 38%, seems quite high, 
but as the respond rate is not 100% the results might be for YSOC 0%-33%, for other 
teams 17%-58%. 
Table 18. Did your company shared cyber threat intelligence during exercise to other 
companies? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 26 70% 5 5 8 8 
No 2 5% 1 0 0 1 
Don’t know 9 25% 4 3 0 2 
 
With question 12 in survey 1, the purpose was to compare how the tools used for 
situation awareness were used for sharing cyber threat intelligence to other 
companies. It is interesting to see in Table 19, that phone was used more often than 
email or incident response tools, when knowing the fact that the YSOC shared 
information using incident response tools with YSHOP and YSTORE and phone was 
not very highly rated as a situation awareness tool (Table 10). 
Table 19. What tools you or your company used to share cyber threat intelligence to 
other companies? 
 
YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE TOTAL 
MISP 5 5 7 6 23 
Phone 3 1 9 8 21 
Email 0 2 5 6 13 
Incident response tools 4 1 6 2 13 
Discussion in psi chat 3 0 1 4 8 
Don't know 2 4 0 2 8 
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It was considered whether or not to include social media as a tool to share cyber 
threat intelligence,  however, there were not so many use cases where it could be 
useful. All BTs could use extranet to provide useful info for their customers. 
5.4.4 Receiving cyber threat intelligence 
When companies and team members tried to keep their situation awareness high 
enough to be able to detect the threats, not only the own collected but also the 
received cyber threat intelligence was in important role as well. If the received cyber 
threat intelligence was good enough, it might help the receiver BT to detect and 
mitigate the threat completely.   
The results in Table 20 for survey 1, question 13, shows that in most of the team’s 
the members were knew that cyber threat intelligence was received from other 
teams. However, as the YSOC had business relations to YSHOP and YSTORE, it can be 
seen based on Table 18 and Table 20 that they shared more cyber threat intelligence 
than received it as it was expected. 
Table 20. Did your company receive any cyber threat intelligence from other 
companies during the exercise? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 29 78% 7 7 5 10 
No 1 3% 0 0 1 0 
Don’t know 7 19% 3 1 2 1 
 
To understand how different tools were used during the exercise, teams were able to 
decide how each tool would be used and freely use them during the exercise. In 
Table 21 are the results for survey 1 question 14. Comparing to survey 1 question 12 
(Table 19), the tools used for sharing and tools used for receiving were quite 
different. 
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Table 21. What tools did your company use to receive cyber threat intelligence from 
other companies? 
 
YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE TOTAL 
Email 3 6 6 9 24 
MISP 5 5 7 5 22 
Social media 5 4 4 9 22 
Phone 2 3 7 8 20 
Incident response tools 3 4 6 2 15 
Don't know 1 2 0 1 4 
RT call with phone 1 0 0 0 1 
 
Phone and email seem to be important tools for communication and sharing 
information. Based on the results of survey 1 question 12 and 14, it is interesting to 
notice that email and phone were undervalued as a tool to maintaining situation 
awareness as seen on survey 1 question 3 (Table 8).  
The only conclusion is that to survey 1 question 3, BT members responded correctly 
as their own point of view what tools were important to maintain their own situation 
awareness on level 1 situation awareness level (Endsley, 1995, 36-37). However, to 
survey 1 questions 12 and 14 they answered all tools they used themselves or knew 
the tools that were used by other team members to share and receive cyber threat 
intelligence. 
Even though the social media was not considered as a tool for sharing cyber threat 
intelligence, it was seen as one tool to receive that information. During the exercise, 
there was a high amount of Twitter tweets and a good amount of CNN news. For 
example, during some attacks, customers, CNN or RT posted data to Twitter or news, 
to give a hint to BT that something is going on (Figure 22). In this case, the 
importance of social media as a situation awareness tool can be identified as level 1 
situation awareness level (Endsley, 1995, 36-37) as in Figure 22 all BTs got 
information that some RT attack is going on against YBANK. 
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Figure 22. CNN news hint that something is going on 
 
5.4.5 Sharing and receiving cyber threat intelligence with MISP 
As seen in Table 19 and Table 21, MISP was identified as a tool to share and receive 
cyber threat intelligence. With answers to survey 1 questions 19 and 20 (Table 22 
and Table 23), when comparing to survey 1 questions 9 and 10 (Table 17 and Table 
18), it can be also seen that team members might not know what other member was 
doing during the exercise so in this case they were not sure whether MISP was used. 
Table 22. Did your company share IOC data using MISP? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 22 59% 3 7 6 6 
No 0 0% 0 0 0 0 
Don’t know 15 41% 7 1 2 5 
 
Table 23. Did your company receive IOC data using MISP? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 21 57% 4 6 5 6 
No 0 0% 0 0 0 0 
Don’t know 16 43% 6 2 3 5 
 
As there were only 16 BT members, four in each company, who had logged into MISP 
during the exercise, there were only a few more who knew that their team member 
was using MISP.  
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In this sense, the usage of MISP might have failed even as there were dedicated 
training sessions available on how to use MISP and it was proposed that MISP is the 
tool to use for controlled sharing of the cyber threat intelligence. 
Based on the responds to survey 1 question 22, most of the respondents considered 
that there should have been more team members as there were too many tools used 
in the exercise to collect and share information; e.g. when the same data was 
collected as a ticket in an incident management system, it was needed to be shared 
to WT with chat and wiki and if it was interesting cyber threat intelligence 
information, it was needed to be shared with MISP as well to other BTs. 
By looking up the data stored in MISP (Table 24) and comparing to usage of other 
tools (Table 9), the usage of MISP was quite low. In chapter 5.4 the actual data stored 
to MIPS is analyzed more detailed. 
 
Table 24. Shared MISP events 
BT MISP Events Attributes 
YBANK 7 26 
YSHOP 5 16 
YSOC 15 34 
YSTORE 7 3 
 
In survey 2, question 15 it was asked how easy it was to collect and store cyber 
threat intelligence with some tools (Figure 23), with value range 1: very easy, 5: very 
hard. During the whole course there was complaints that the chat and the wiki pages 
(Collab) were difficult to use, but it seems that when there were additional training 
sessions related to these tools, the training affected positively at least to chat and 
wiki tools so that they were easy to use in the exercise.  
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Figure 23. How easy was it to collect and store cyber threat intelligence with 
following tools? 
Based on Figure 23, there is not so such big difference with incident response tools 
and MISP. Although, in order to be able to use tools efficient way it can be assumed 
that BTs had dealt with the learning issue in their team. Based on the login logs of 
MISP, there was no evidence that BT members were trying to learn to use MISP by 
themselves during the preparation phase, which reflects the somewhat higher mean 
value 3.1 in Figure 23. 
 
5.4.6 Mitigation of threats 
One of the problems in these kind of exercises is how to verify what information was 
used to mitigate threats. For example, if one BT identifies a malicious email and then 
the email sender is then blocked by tools used in another BT, there should be 
evidences in some logs in another BT systems that the malicious email was noticed 
and blocked.  
In Figure 24 is a malware analyzed by YSOC. This information was shared with 
YSTORE and YSHOP. At least YSHOP reacted to it and implemented the needed email 
filters. 
Average value=2,8 
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Figure 24. YSOC malware analysis 
 
While investigating all other RT attacks, there was no evidence found that shared 
cyber threat intelligence might have helped to mitigate the threats. Question 15 in 
survey 1 tried to collect information on if an individual team member was using the 
collected or shared cyber threat intelligence used to mitigate threats (Table 25).   
Table 25. Did you use the collected or shared cyber threat intelligence to mitigate 
threats? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 17 46% 5 2 5 5 
No 20 54% 5 6 3 6 
 
Question 16 on survey 1 tried to collect information on if the respondent knew that 
the collected or shared cyber threat intelligence was used to mitigate threats (Table 
26). 
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Table 26. Did your company use the collected or shared cyber threat intelligence to 
mitigate threats? 
 
N % YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Yes 23 62% 7 4 6 6 
No 5 14% 0 1 2 2 
Don’t know 9 24% 3 3 0 3 
 
Based on Table 25 and Table 26 once again at on individual level responders can 
identify if they used the cyber threat intelligence to mitigate threats, however, still a 
totally five thought that no cyber threat intelligence was used to mitigate threats and 
even nine were not even sure about it. 
 
5.4.7 Quality of cyber threat intelligence 
In survey 1 (Appendix 1) questions 17 and 18, the respondents were asked to define 
were if the collected and received cyber threat intelligence was meaningful, i.e. if the 
collected or received data should help to maintain or improve the situation 
awareness and to mitigate the threats. The respondents were given choice to give 
value between 1-5, in Figure 25, only 37 answers were received. The average value is 
for collected data 2.3 and for received data 1.9. 
 
Figure 25. Quality of collected and received cyber threat intelligence 
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Based on Figure 25. Quality of collected and received cyber threat intelligence, it 
might be considered that all teams think that their own collected cyber threat 
intelligence has a better quality than the cyber threat intelligence received from 
somewhere else. This is well reflected with the survey 1 question 21, Figure 26, 
which shows that in a scale 0-5, the quality of the received IOCs in MISP had an 
average value 2.13. 
 
Figure 26. Quality of received MISP IOCs 
Same kinds of questions were asked in survey 2 as well. The respondents were asked 
to define the quality of their own and shared cyber threat intelligence and define the 
quality of the received cyber threat intelligence with value range 0-5 (survey 2, 
questions 10 and 11, Table 27).  
Table 27. Overall quality of collected, shared and received cyber threat intelligence 
Question Min 
value 
Max 
value 
Average Median Sum 
Standard 
Deviation 
10. Overall quality of your own 
collected and shared cyber threat 
intelligence 
0 4 2.18 2 24 1.08 
11. Overall quality of received 
cyber threat intelligence 
1 4 2.73 3 30 0.9 
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For survey 1 question 17: “Was the collected cyber threat intelligence meaningful?” 
the average is 2.3 and for survey 1 question 18: “Was the received cyber threat 
intelligence meaningful?” the average is 1.9. The respondents of all BTs considered 
than the information collected by themselves was more useful than the received 
information. On the other hand, the survey 2 respondents considered that the 
quality of the received information was better than their own. 
When it was asked in survey 2, questions 8 and 9 how trustworthy they thought that 
the cyber threat intelligence was, there was no big difference as seen in Table 28. 
Table 28. Trusting the cyber threat intelligence 
Question Min 
value 
Max 
value 
Average Median Sum 
Standard 
Deviation 
8. When you received some 
cyber threat intelligence from 
another company, did you trust 
it? 
1 5 3.36 4 37 1.12 
9. Do you think that your own 
shared cyber threat intelligence 
was trusted? 
2 5 3.45 3 38 1.04 
 
The results for survey 2 questions 8-11 might reflect the responses to survey 2 
questions 3-7 as if the quality of the information was considered high enough, the 
respondents trusted the received information, so there was no need to discuss or 
give feedback about the received information as much as was expected to be. 
In survey 2 question 12 it was asked to fill in the quality of the received cyber threat 
intelligence from different sources, where the options to answer were 0: not 
received, 1: low quality – 5: high quality (Table 29). 
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Table 29. Quality of the received cyber threat intelligence from different sources 
Company Average Median 
YSOC 2.55 3 
YBANK 2.09 3 
YSHOP 2.55 3 
YSTORE 2.27 3 
CSC 2.18 3 
Telia (by email) 2.36 2 
FUNNEL 0.36 0 
LAW and ORDER 1.09 1 
RNA 0.73 0 
SATSUMA 0.64 0 
STEVENSBLOG 0.36 0 
WATTI 0.45 1 
Shared CVEs (CNN news) 1.46 1 
ALL 1.48 1 
 
When comparing the values in Table 29 to the results of question survey 2 question 
11, in Table 27, where the average was 2.73, it can be noticed that the overall quality 
of received cyber threat intelligence was estimated to be higher than any of the 
individual ones.  
5.5 Analysis of created MISP events 
Table 30 presents the data collected from different tools in the game environment: 
the count of incidents from incident management system, the count of event pages 
from wiki and the count of events in MISP. 
Table 30. BTs and their incidents and events 
 Exercise day 1 (10:00-17:30) Exercise day 2 (9:00-12:00) 
BT Incidents Wiki 
Events 
MISP 
Events 
MISP 
Attributes 
Incidents Wiki 
Events 
MISP 
Events 
MISP 
Attributes 
YBANK 23 14 3 17 12 10 4 9 
YSHOP 22 16 4 13 33 7 1 3 
YSOC 45 35 10 24 30 15 5 10 
YSTORE 16 17 4 3 3 10 3 0 
 
One of the earliest attacks was on the day 1 morning an attack where RT scanned 
some ports of all BTs. As a good example YBANK was able to detect the scan and it 
was correctly reported as incident, wiki page and MISP event (Figure 27). 
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Figure 27. YBANK detected malicious scanning 
 
As the MISP event was not shared, the relationship of the attacks was not detected 
by other BTs, although as a MISP system administrator the relationships between 
different events could be identified (Figure 28).  
 
Figure 28. MISP event relationships related to detected malicious IPv4 address 
In Figure 28, YSTORE reported their own event number 60 and YSOC reported their 
own event 61 and 63, which was affecting YSTORE. YSOC also detected the attack 
against YSHOP and just warned YSHOP. On the other hand, YSHOP managed to 
identify the malicious IPv4, but did not report into MISP for unknown reasons.  
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If considered from the national cyber security center point of view, it would be 
critical to know if an attack is against one company or one IPv4 address, or if the 
attack is against many companies, i.e. affecting hundreds of IPv4 addresses. As it was 
early in the exercise, it was assumed that as the attack was easy to detect, the BTs 
would have time to learn how to use MISP to create valid MISP event and collect 
relevant and correct cyber threat intelligence i.e. source IPv4 addresses and target 
information as MISP attributes. 
By looking up the RT attack blueprints, it was possible to estimate and calculate the 
number of expected IOCs for each event. Table 31 was defined when RT IOCs were 
combined to the data seen on the MISP as attributes.  In Table 31, all MISP attributes 
were analyzed and compared to the public OSINT feeds events and attributes which 
can be enabled in MISP. High quality means that the attribute followed the good 
practices of MISP OSINT feeds and low-quality means that the attribute needs some 
editing to be valuable information for the consumer of that cyber threat intelligence. 
Table 31. Expected IOCs vs analyzed MISP attributes 
 Exercise day 1 (10:00-17:30) Exercise day 2 (9:00-12:00) 
BT Expected 
IOCs 
Reported 
MISP 
Attributes 
High 
quality 
Low-
quality 
Expected 
IOCs 
Reported 
MISP 
Attributes 
High 
quality 
Low- 
quality 
YBANK 34 17 16 1 38 9 7 2 
YSHOP 42 13 13 0 26 3 3 0 
YSOC 44 24 17 7 22 10 7 3 
YSTORE 40 3 2 1 26 0 0 0 
 
In Table 31 it can be seen how the speed of the exercise affected to the BTs. As on 
the day 2, teams could also mitigate threats, there was less time for reporting as 
well. Although on day 1, 6.5 high quality MISP attributes was reported for each hour, 
on day 2 5.7 for each hour. As expected, the BTs were learning and were faster, so 
they managed to keep high quality reporting to MISP as well. 
In Table 31 can be seen that there was good opportunity to collect good amount of 
cyber threat intelligence, however, the major problem of the exercise is to capture 
the RT IOCs as well. During the exercise, RT tried to collect their own set of IOCs 
based on what was defined in the RT blue prints filled with the information of the 
environment such as the source IPv4 addresses of their attacks and some of the 
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attack targets for email phishing scenarios were decided just couple of minutes 
before the attacks.  
The amount of reported RT IOCs was 114, less than expected in Table 30, where the 
total amount of 272 IOCs was expected to be seen. While comparing the RT IOCs to 
the BT reported ones, it was found that BTs managed to collect 14 MISP attributes 
that matches to 12 different RT events and their IOCs (Table 32).   
Table 32. Correct MISP attributes reported for detected RT events 
 YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Correct MISP attributes 3 3 6 2 
 
While investigating how WT events were detected and reported, as it was earlier 
seen in Table 6, most of the BTs were not collecting cyber threat intelligence from 
the game environment or if they were, the identified data was not stored in wiki or 
any other tools provided in the game environment. Based on the WT blueprints, the 
minimum expected MISP attributes were calculated (Table 33). 
Table 33. Expected and reported correct MISP attributes for WT events 
 YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Expected MISP attributes 83 71 82 71 
Reported correct MISP 
Attributes for WT events 
0 0 4 0 
 
As MISP was selected as the tool to be used to share cyber threat intelligence, it is 
somewhat obvious that either the teams did not have enough resources, or the 
process of handling cyber threat intelligence was totally ignored. This can be seen 
when all relevant information of RT and WT events together with expected and 
reported cyber threat intelligence is summarized in Table 34. 
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Table 34. Summary of exercise events, containing expected MISP attributes vs 
reported MISP attributes 
 YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
All events 52 45 48 43 
All expected MISP Attributes 155 139 148 137 
All detected events 10 10 24 11 
Detected RT events 8 8 7 7 
Expected MISP attributes for detected RT events 72 68 66 66 
RT events reported to MISP 3 3 4 2 
Reported correct MISP Attributes for RT events 3 3 6 2 
Detected WT events 2 2 17 4 
Expected MISP attributes for detected WT 
events 
4 4 42 8 
WT events reported to MISP 0 0 3 0 
Reported correct MISP Attributes for WT 
events 
0 0 4 0 
All reported correct MISP attributes 3 3 10 2 
 
When considering the European Union General Data Protecting Regulation 
(Regulation 2016/679) where article 33 defines, that in a case of a personal data 
breach, the supervisory authority needs to be notified no later than 72 hours after 
detecting the data breach. In cyber security exercise that would have meant that 
correct detection of the attack source and destination and correctly reporting it 
would have been quite enough for the CSC played by WT. There is a difference if the 
RT attack affects the YBANK banking web application or e.g. the extranet web 
application. Those different risk levels were also identified by the YBANK team 
themselves (YBANK Blue Team, 2018). 
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6 Discussion on results 
In chapter 3.2, some goals for collecting and sharing cyber threat intelligence was 
defined in the exercise context. In this chapter, the goals are analyzed based on the 
exercise together with insights to situational awareness. 
6.1 Analyzing the Goal 1 
The goal 1 was: For each cyber security incident BTs should collect source and 
destination information as atomic indicators. By only looking up the data stored in 
MIPS the goal was not reached at all (Table 34). Even if looking at the data stored in 
wiki pages or in the incident management systems, the number of correct atomic 
indicators has not increased much (Table 35). 
Table 35. Atomic indicators detected on wiki pages or in the incident management 
systems 
 YBANK YSHOP YSOC YSTORE 
Correct atomic indicators 15 19 5 12 
 
The only conclusion might be the fact, that even though the respondents to the 
survey 2 question 13 (Figure 18) considered that they knew the terms in the cyber 
security context, the atomic indicators are difficult to find, analyze and report 
correctly using the provide tools.   
As the MISP was valued to be more difficult to use, survey 2 question 15 (Figure 23), 
and that together with the low average value 1.3 for atomic indicator as a term 
(Figure 18), might reflect the issue that, the atomic indicators were difficult to report 
with MISP, but easier to report in free text form within wiki pages or in the incident 
management system. To be able to use the atomic indicator in security controls, the 
indicators often needs to be defined in tool-specific technical format. 
One of the key question was the allocation of team resources on BTs. How existing 
resources distributed to different tasks during the exercise? Even though there were 
1-2 dedicated resources in each BT team to work with cyber threat intelligence, the 
amount of time they used to do it is unknown. Based on the amount of collected 
cyber threat intelligence, it can be only assumed that there might not have been 
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enough resources to collect cyber threat intelligence as keeping the technical 
business environment working is eventually more important than all other tasks, 
which was also identified by YBANK on their assets and risk analysis (YBANK Blue 
Team, 2018). 
6.2 Analyzing the Goal 2 
The goal 2 was that BTs should try to collect any tool, malware, vulnerability or 
attack pattern information. Even if it was suspected that the Goal 1 might be difficult 
for teams, however, to detect even one malware or attack pattern should not be 
totally impossible task.   
At least all BTs were handling at least one CVE vulnerability technical report and 
based on the gathered information, the CVEs were analyzed and decided if there is a 
need for further actions.  
On the other hand, all BTs trusted the IPv4 address list (Appendix 4, set 2 and 3), so 
that the data was not verified before traffic black lists were defined in firewalls 
(Figure 29). It seems that at least YSTORE did not block the valid traffic to Twitter and 
CNN web addresses as those addresses were on the list, hence, so some validation 
might have been made to the lists. 
 
Figure 29. Blacklist created based on Telia IPv4 address list 
 
The Appendix 16: the malicious code was not detected by any BT, before it was 
directly linked to Twitter. Even then YSOC analysts did not realize that the code 
contains IPv4 address of their own email server (Figure 30). 
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Figure 30. YSOC fails to detect their own IPv4 address 
 
The RT attack scenario CSE311 (Ruusupiha, 2018) contained a technical attack 
pattern how the attack will be executed. It can be verified that at least YBANK 
detected the attack correctly and reported it into MISP as well (Figure 31). Goal 2 
was achieved as it was assumed that maybe only one case can be solved by BTs when 
time schedules were expected to be very tight for an advanced analysis. 
 
Figure 31. YBANK detected attack pattern and tools 
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6.3 Analyzing the Goal 3 
Goal 3 was related to identifying the threat actors. The idea was that law 
enforcement needs detailed information of threat actors so that they can catch them 
and convict them without a doubt. 
As analyzed for Table 6, it looks like the BTs were not interesting to follow up social 
media content in an organized way. Only the YSOC managed to collect the data 
related to the WT801 (Hyytiäinen, 2018) and YSOC started to collect data in MISP 
(Figure 32), but also shared some information by email to CSC as well.  
 
Figure 32. YSOC detected FINESTONIA 
6.4 Analyzing the Goal 4 
The major focus of the exercise was on to understand how BTs collect and share 
cyber threat intelligence. As it was discussed when analyzing the survey 2 questions 
4-7 (Table 14 and Table 15), there was no real evidence found that the cyber security 
analysts had created their own group of experts sharing and discussing cyber threat 
intelligence. 
While analyzing the survey 1 questions 10, Table 17, it was seen that some small 
amount of BT members were sharing the cyber threat intelligence to other BT. Goal 4 
is partially fulfilled as there was only few people responsible for sharing cyber threat 
intelligence to another BT, however, eventually no expert group of analysts was seen 
for example trying to analyze what kind of mitigation is needed to prevent CSE311 
(Ruusupiha, 2018) occurring again on exercise day 2. 
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6.5 Analyzing the Goal 5 
This goal is a direct continuum of goals 1, 2 and 4. In the exercise setup some of the 
events were planned so that some of the RT attacks were played on both days. The 
aim was to detect if the collected cyber threat intelligence was used to mitigate the 
same threat occurring again on exercise day 2. The RT attack scenario CSE311 
(Ruusupiha, 2018) was one of them.  
The CSE311 was for example executed against YBANK on day one and day two. As 
the CSE311 was detected by YBANK (Figure 31) on day one, they did not plan any 
mitigation solutions for day two. The reason why there was no mitigation solution 
might be obvious: it is easy to think that RT might try as many different kinds of 
attack scenarios against each BT and once one had been detected by one BT it will be 
tried again against the same BT. However, the as the one course objectives is to learn 
how to mitigate detected cyber security threats, it was expected that mitigation 
would have been performed by all BTs. 
Based on the incident management information by YSHOP, they identified the 
vulnerable plugin related to CSE311 correctly (Figure 33), which was uninstalled from 
the system as well.  
 
Figure 33. YSHOP detection of malicious plugin for CSE311 
 
But YSHOP did not post the full mitigation solution with MISP as it should have done 
(Figure 34) or there is no evidence that it was shared in any other way to other BTs. 
By sharing the information correctly, YBANK should have had all correct information 
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to mitigate the CSE311 on exercise day two. In this case YBANK should have had 
enough time to do the mitigation before the second attack on day two. 
 
Figure 34. YSHOP reported CSE311 to MISP 
 
One of the many problems is how to identify what log data, social media information 
etc. has been analyzed as cyber threat intelligence and used to mitigate attacks and 
threats. To collect the chain of reasoning happening during the OODA loop might be 
required. 
One solution could be that RT together with WT plans in more detailed what kind of 
cyber threat intelligence is shared during the exercise, for example by CSC. The aim 
could be that for some scenarios the correct mitigation solution might be given as a 
CVE report and for some others it could require collecting and analyzing data from 
several sources. The data should not be revealed to all BTs at the same time, rather 
so that each BT will have their own set of information and that information 
combined with the information shared and received with other BTs reveal the 
detailed attack scenario planned by RT. 
6.6 Analyzing MISP as a tool 
One of the goals of this research was to learn how MISP can be used for collecting, 
handling and sharing the cyber threat intelligence. As already discussed in Chapter 
5.4 it might be considered based on Table 32 that BTs failed totally at least to collect 
correct and high-quality IOCs to MISP. 
When considering the requirements presented in the thesis on Requirement 
specification for cyber security situational awareness (Lötjönen 2017), new situation 
awareness system is needed for BTs, so that the number of tools used for situation 
awareness is less than used on this research. As it was seen, some cyber threat 
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intelligence was correctly stored, for example in incidents or in wiki, however, it was 
never correctly shared with MISP to another team. Either there were too many tools 
to be used or the learning curve of some of the tools was too high. 
If the aim of a live cyber security exercise is to train teams to collect, analyze, share 
and enrich the cyber threat intelligence, the whole exercise scenario needs to be 
planned differently. If there are too many technical RT attacks or too tight time 
schedule between them, BTs do not have time to collect any cyber threat intelligence 
at all; they are focusing on the logs to detect incidents and then handling those 
incidents. Between RT attacks, BTs needs to have some time to analyze and share 
cyber security intelligence of the detected attack scenario. This issue was also 
identified as risk R3 in chapter 3.4. 
By looking up the organization structures of the BTs, all of them had dedicated 
resources responsible for handling cyber threat intelligence. The question that 
cannot be answered based on this research is: why is the amount of collected cyber 
threat intelligence low as seen on the summary Table 34.  
Lötjönen proposes in his system construction (2017, 57-60) that the data is 
automatically collected e.g. from logs, log management system and from other 
technical systems. It can be argued that if the exercise is more technical, from the 
learning point of view it might be valuable on situation awareness level 1 to use the 
different tools as is, however, if the exercise focus is more on the process side where 
different information flows are more important, then the correct amount of data 
aggregation might save valuable time for other task like collecting, analyzing and 
sharing cyber threat intelligence. 
Based on this research, it cannot be stated if MISP cannot be used on live exercises. It 
can be considered that the MISP might a have high learning curve which was not 
realized by the users who were supposed to use it. It might be because respondents 
to survey 2, question 13 had issues to understand what atomic indicator is as seen on 
Figure 18. It will not be easy to map atomic indicator to MISP attribute if there is a 
small doubt what that piece of information is and what it should represent as an 
attribute on a MISP event. 
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Goal 1 was: For each cyber security incident BTs should have been collected source 
and destination information of the attack as atomic indicators. The question arises if 
the IPv4 address is one of the basic things to understand about computer networks, 
why there were so few correct IPv4 source or IPv4 destination addresses identified? 
In the survey 1 question 22, there are some answers related to MISP, tools and 
situation awareness (translated from Finnish): 
• Non-MISP user: too many communication channels, there was time only to focus on 
one to two tools 
• Non-MISP user: main situation awareness tool was the incident management system 
and I did not have time to look at MISP at all. As a team we did not get enough 
situation awareness info from other BTs and it looked like our team should have 
more people working with MISP 
• Non-MISP user: it looks like we did not notice any attacks at all, if we would have 
identified some of the attacks soon enough, there might have been time to inform 
other teams about them. We had too little time to do the analysis of the detected 
attacks, which would have been needed to do better hardening 
• MISP user: the MISP was interesting addition to the exercise 
• MISP user: we had so much things to do, that handling of cyber threat intelligence 
was almost ignored, so we were not able to use if for hardening our environment. 
We were too unexperienced. 
• MISP user: MISP is new kind of tool and as such might not be optimal for exercise. 
Near end of the exercise I realized how the tool could have been used. MISP requires 
decent training as it is quite technical tool. 
• MISP user: Good tools, but in the exercise, situation was not the best possible for 
that kind of tool usage. Most of the focus went to operative incident management 
tasks. 
• MISP user: it was difficult to understand the mapping of information to MISP 
attributes. Overall it might be good tool, but in this kind of fast exercise there should 
be lighter simpler solution. The idea is good though. 
 
Based on these freeform answers, BTs might have failed to identify the risk R1 
(chapter 3.4), even though they have allocated resources for handling cyber threat 
intelligence, those resources were not enough in this exercise and research. 
MISP might be a good tool for advanced users who understand the technical side of 
the IOCs (the identified risk R2). The conclusion is that to be able to arrange an 
exercise where collecting, handling and sharing cyber threat intelligence is required 
with a tool which might have high learning curve, handling the identified risks on 
chapter 3.4 needs to be taken care of.  
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6.7 Analyzing the situation awareness 
In his thesis, Lötjönen (2017) illustrates how cyber security information is shared and 
consumed based on his experience (Figure 35). As there was no guidance given to 
BTs how to organize their team structure or incident management processes, each of 
the BTs followed a similar kind of structure as pictured Figure 35. This was also seen 
in Figure 14, where YSHOP organization structure is illustrated.  
 
Figure 35. Cyber Security information consumers and providers (Lötjönen, 2017, 38) 
 
Based on the amount of collected cyber threat intelligence it can be stated that the 
BTs might have failed to understand the importance of collecting and sharing of the 
cyber threat intelligence as a part of situational awareness. Another conclusion is 
that the current tools what was used in the exercise were not suitable for collecting 
and sharing cyber threat intelligence based on the survey 2 question 15 (Figure 23). 
These 2 issues were also identified by several respondents to free form survey 1 
question 22. 
It can be stated that all BTs were using the situation awareness tools provided by the 
game environment. It was allowed to install new security controls or situation 
awareness tools, but none of the BTs take the opportunity to do it. 
Based on the Table 10 it can be concluded that in this kind of research setup and in 
this exercise, the BTs were using quite much time on analyzing logs on log 
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management system or handling different kind of incidents to maintaining the level 1 
and level 2 situation awareness. As such it is a good learning experience for the 
bachelor’s degree students or anyone else who have none or small amount of work 
experience of those tasks. 
Overall time schedule might have been the problem, the time between technical 
attacks might have been too tight. Survey 1 question 5 might have some insights, 
when comparing users who were using MISP to users who were not using MISP, as it 
was considered that the MISP users were responsible to share the threat intelligence 
to another BT. 
In Figure 36 the survey 1 question 5 data are split to two groups: MISP users vs non 
MISP users. Average values of data were recalculated so that the most important 
tool was given weight 7 and least important 1. 
Based on the Figure 36, the users of MISP, might have used quite many situation 
awareness tool or at least the importance of some tools were much higher than 
comparing to non MISP users group. It seems like that the workload might have been 
high, as the cyber threat intelligence or information that those MIPS users needed 
was scattered among several different tools.  
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Figure 36. Most important situation awareness tool: MISP users vs non MISP users 
Based on the incidents in incident management systems, there was no such detailed 
information based on what data the incident has been originally made. In that sense 
it makes sense, that MISP users to be able to share correct and valid cyber threat 
intelligence, they need to go through all systems to verify and find all information 
related to the incident in the incident management system. There needs to be 
communication between team members so that the correct information is found, 
which might explain the highly valued team communication as well. 
It might also explain the quality of collected cyber threat intelligence in MISP. If the 
detailed information why an incident that was reported to incident management 
system was lost, it might be very difficult to find that data afterwards.  Based on this 
research there is a need to consider what kind of data aggregation (Lötjönen, 2017, 
60) is needed in the new situation awareness tool.  
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The data aggregation might need to be configurable so that depending on the 
exercise focus it can be configured correctly. If the live cyber security exercise is 
more focused on the technical side, it might be relevant for the participants to look 
up data directly from the logs or log management systems. On the other hand, if the 
focus is on training processes, it should be possible to use aggregation to create 
more advanced situation awareness user interfaces for BT members. 
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7 Conclusions 
The first idea for this thesis started to evolve during on the cyber security exercise 
course on spring 2017, where author realized as white member that the existing 
exercise tools were not good enough for keeping up the situation awareness of the 
exercise in decent level regardless of the team where you were. When trying to 
follow whats going on in each team was really difficult. 
The discussions about this thesis topic started later on 2017 with the assignee 
organization JYVSECTEC, when author realized that there was ongoing thesis work 
defining the requirement specification for the situation awareness tools for blue 
teams (Lötjönen, 2017).  
Author has always been interested to knowledge and information management, to 
help organizations to improve processes and to help organizations to select correct 
tools for knowledge and information management as well. These personal interests 
also affected not only research questions, but to the selection of reserch methods 
too.  
It would have been interesting to get insights how red team and white team 
maintains their situation awareness through the exercise as well, but limiting this 
research to include only blue teams was needeed to get get first hand information as 
a results from the two surveys, how different tools were used not only for personall 
situation awareness but for team situation awareness as well during a cyber security 
exercise.   
Some of the research questions were related how cyber threat intelligence is 
collected, analyzed and shared during cyber security exercise, the empirical research 
was selected as at the moment there is not research done on that field, a case study 
during a cyber security exercise course was used to collect information how 
organizations works during a cyber security exercise. 
Both surveys offers new information how different tools were used not only for 
situation awareness, but also for cyber threat intelligence as this was first cyber 
security exercise, in assigned organization JYVSECTEC, where MISP was used as a tool 
by blue teams. 
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The results presented here should help JYVSECTEC to design and plan cyber security 
exercices so that main focus of the exercise could be to learn how to collect, analyze, 
share and enrich the cyber threat intelligence. 
This thesis offers new information how situation awareness is handled in cyber 
security exercises by blue teams. Results should also help JYVSECTEC to implement 
the proposed sitaution awareness system for blue teams (Lötjönen, 2017).  
There is a need to do further research of the situation awareness of the blue teams. 
As it was seen on this research the communication inside the team was one of the 
most used method to keep up the personall situation awareness. Based on survey 
one, even tough the organization structures were defined before exercise, the 
members of blue teams were not able to answer for example if the company had 
shared cyber threat intelligence or not. 
To understand how a  blue team is actually functioning there is a need to research 
for each cyber security incident identified by the blue team, what kind of incident 
response sub group inside the blue team is created, how do they communicate, what 
kind of information is shared inside that sub group and what information is shared to 
the rest of the blue team. 
A lot of issues related to how to collect, analyze, share and enrich the cyber threat 
intelligence can be seen as a knowledge management problem. As the knowledge 
management itself is complicated problem to be solved, to have globally connected 
tools or sofware systems, which can be used to share cyber threat intelligence will 
happen in future, but when and is it MISP or some other tool, time will tell. As one 
way to handle the cyber security threats is to have high quality cyber threat 
intelligence which can be trusted. 
Even tough there are tools which can be used to solve many problems, tools cannot 
solve the problem if the users does not understand what problem the tool should 
resolve. Defining requirements and selecting a correct tool for collect, handling, 
sharing and enrich cyber threat intelligence in cyber security exercise can be seen as 
own reseach topic as well.  
85 
 
 
References 
Adnan, M.,  Just, M., Baillie, L.,  Kayacik, H. G. 2015. Investigating the work practices 
of network security professionals. Information & Computer Security, Vol. 23 Issue: 3, 
pp.347-367. Referenced 30 January 2018. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org.ezproxy.jamk.fi:2443/10.1108/ICS-07-2014-0049 
Al-Ibrahim, O., Mohaisen, A., Kamhoua, C., Kwiat, K., Njilla, L. 2017. Beyond Free 
Riding: Quality of Indicators for Assessing Participation in Information Sharing for 
Threat Intelligence. Technical Report 2017, University at Buffalo and Air Force 
Research Lab (88ABW-2017-0416). Accessed 2 January 2018. Retrieved from 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.00552 
Borum,R., Felker,J., Kern, S., Dennesen, K., Feyes, T.  2015. Strategic cyber 
intelligence, Information & Computer Security, Vol. 23 Issue: 3, pp.317-332. Accessed 
16 January 2018. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1108/ICS-09-2014-0064 
Brehmer, B. 2005. The Dynamic OODA Loop: Amalgamating Boyd’s OODA loop and 
the Cybernetic Approach to Command and Control. In 10th International Command 
and Control Research and Technology Symposium, The Future of C2. Accessed 9 April 
2018. Retrieved from 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7e9d/23a6911d636666338358505613bb5eba43b8.
pdf 
Cyber Security Exercise YIIP3400. 2018. JAMK University of Applied Sciencies. 
Accessed 24 May 2018. Retrived from 
https://asio.jamk.fi/pls/asio/asio_ectskuv1.kurssin_ks?ktun=YIIP3400 
Directive (EU) 2016/1148. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and 
information systems across the Union. Official Journal of the European Union. 
Accessed 9 January 2018. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016L1148&from=EN 
El Sawy, O. A.,  Majchrzak, A. 2004. Critical issues in research on real‐time knowledge 
management in enterprises, Journal of Knowledge Management, Vol. 8 Issue: 4, 
pp.21-37. Accessed 9 April 2018. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org/10.1108/13673270410548469. 
Endsley, M.R. 1995. Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems. 
Human Factors Journal 37(1), 32-64. Accessed 9 January 2018. Retrieved from 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1518/001872095779049543 
Europol, 2017. Common Taxonomy for Law Enforcement and The National Network 
of CSIRTs v1.3 – December 2017. Europol, European Union Agency for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation, European Union. Accessed 7 May 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/common_taxonomy_
for_law_enforcement_and_csirts_v1.3.pdf 
Executive Order No. 13691. 2015. DCPD-201500098 - Executive Order 13691-
Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing. Accessed 9 January 
86 
 
 
2018. Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201500098/pdf/DCPD-
201500098.pdf 
Franke, U. Brynielsson, J. 2014. Cyber situational awareness – A systematic review of 
the literature. Computers & Society Volume 46, pages 18-41. Referenced 25 January 
2018. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2014.06.008.  
Fusano, A., Sato, H., Namatame, A. 2011. Study of multi-agent based combat 
simulation for grouped OODA Loop. SICE Annual Conference (SICE), 2011 Proceedings 
of, pp. 131-136. Referenced 10 April 2018. Retrieved from 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6060590/ 
Garrido-Pelaz, R.,  González-Manzano, l., Pastrana, S. 2016. Shall we collaborate? A 
model to analyse the benefits of information sharing. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM 
on Workshop on Information Sharing and Collaborative Security Pages 15-24. 
Accessed 2 January 2018. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.08774v1 
Hyytiäinen, P. 2018. MISP IOC Objective Blueprint WT801 FINESTONIA Campaign. 
YTCP0400 Cyber Security Exercise Report 19 April 2018. JAMK University of Applied 
Sciences.  
Hyytiäinen, P., Manninen, K., Väisänen, T. 2015. IOC-tietojen vaihto käyttäen MISP:iä 
(Using MISP to share IOC information). Cyber security employment training. JAMK 
University of Applied Sciences. 
Implementation of Cyber Exercise TTKW0320. 2018. JAMK University of Applied 
Sciencies. Accessed 24 May 2018. Retrived from 
https://asio.jamk.fi/pls/asio/asio_ectskuv1.kurssin_ks?ktun=TTKW0320 
Johnson, C., Badger, L., Waltermire, D., Snyder, J., Skorupka, C. 2016. NIST Special 
Publication 800-150 : Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing. National Institute of 
Standards and Technology. Accessed 10 January 2018. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-150 
Kokkonen, T. 2016. Anomaly-Based Online Intrusion Detection System as a Sensor for 
Cyber Security Situational Awareness System. Doctoral Dissertation. Faculty of 
Information Tehcnology. Universtity of Jyväskylä. Accessed 2 January 2018. Retrieved 
from http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-39-6832-8 
Koskinen, K. 2010. Organisational memories in project‐based companies: an 
autopoietic view. The Learning Organization, Vol. 17 Issue: 2, pp.149-162. Accessesd 
9 April 2018. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1108/09696471011019862 
Lötjonen, J. 2017. Requirement specification for cyber security situational awareness: 
Defender's approach in cyber security exercises. Master Thesis (yamk). Degree 
Programme in Information Technology (Ylempi AMK / MSc). JAMK University of 
Applied Sciencies. Accessed 3 January 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.theseus.fi/handle/10024/139812 
Lötjönen, J., Jokinen, J., Saarisilta, J., Saharinen, K. 2018. YTCP0400.8K0D1 Cyber 
Exercise Course Description. Accesed 27 April 2018. Retrieved from 
https://optima.jamk.fi/learning/id2/bin/doc_show?id=3142683&ws=3142683 
87 
 
 
Mavroeidis, V., Bromander, S. 2017. Cyber Threat Intelligence Model: An Evaluation 
of Taxonomies, Sharing Standards, and Ontologies within Cyber Threat Intelligence. 
Proceedings of 2017 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference 
(EISIC), pages 91-98. Accessed 2 January 2018. Retrieved from 
http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-61200 
MISP Community, 2018. MISP – User Guide A Threat Sharing Platform. Git repo: 
https://github.com/MISP/misp-book. Referenced 11 May 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.circl.lu/doc/misp/book.pdf 
MISP - Open Source Threat Intelligence Platform & Open Standards For Threat 
Information Sharing. n.d. Referenced  3 January 2018. https://www.misp-project.org/ 
Moihasen, A., Al-Ibrahim, O., Kamhoua, C., Kwiat, K., Njilla, L. 2017. Rethinking 
information sharing for threat intelligence. Proceedings of the fifth ACM/IEEE 
Workshop on Hot Topics in Web Systems and Technologies. Article No. 6. Accessed 2 
January 2018. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1145/3132465.3132468 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of The European Parliament and The Council, 2016. 
General Data Protection Regulation. Accessed 8 May 2018. Retrieved from 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679 
Ruusupiha, M. 2018. Red Team Objective Blueprint CSE312. YTCP0400 Cyber Security 
Exercise Report 19 April 2018. JAMK University of Applied Sciences. 
Sharkov, G. 2016. From Cybersecurity to Collaborative Resiliency. SafeConfig '16 
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active 
Cyber Defense, Pages 3-9. Accessed 27 December 2017. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2994475.2994484. 
Sillaber, C., Sauerwein, C., Mussmann, A., Breu,R. 2016. Data Quality Challenges and 
Future Research Directions in Threat Intelligence Sharing Practice. WISCS '16- 
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Workshop on Information Sharing and 
Collaborative Security. Accessed 2 January 2018. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2994539.2994546 
Simola, V., Koskinen, P. 2018. Red Team Objective Blueprint CSE111, Capital 
Punishment. YTCP0400 Cyber Security Exercise Report 19 April 2018. JAMK University 
of Applied Sciences. 
Sommestad T., Hallberg J. 2012. Cyber Security Exercises and Competitions as a 
Platform for Cyber Security Experiments. In: Jøsang A., Carlsson B. (eds) Secure IT 
Systems. NordSec 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7617. Springer, 
Berlin, Heidelberg. Accessed 9 April 2018. Original reference 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-34210-3_4. Retrieved from 
http://www.sommestad.com/teodor/Filer/Sommestad,%20Hallberg%20-
%202012%20-
%20Cyber%20security%20exercises%20and%20competitions%20as%20a%20platfor
m%20for%20cyber%20security%20experiments.pdf 
Sørensen, L. J. 2012. Distributed Situation Awareness: Experimental Studies into Team 
Work. PhD Thesis, University of Southampton, Faculty of Engineering and the  
88 
 
 
Environment. Accessed 9 April 2018. Retrieved from 
https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/355965/ 
Tuomi, I. 1999. Data is more than knowledge: Implications of the reversed knowledge 
hierarchy for knowledge management and organizational memory. Journal of 
Management Information Systems: JMIS; Armonk Vol. 16, Iss. 3,  (Winter 
1999/2000): 103-117. Accessed 9 April 2018. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07421222.1999.11518258 
Vatanen, M. et al. 2017. JYVSECTEC CYBER RANGE, RGCE and solutions. Accessed on 
4.4 April 2017. Retrieved from http://jyvsectec.fi/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/02/JYVSECTEC-cyber-range.pdf 
Weerakkody, Niranjala. 2015. Research methods for media and communication 2nd 
Edition. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195588033. 
Wood, M. 2013. Scapy p.08 – Making a Christmas Tree Packet. Accessed on 2. 
January 2018. https://thepacketgeek.com/scapy-p-08-making-a-christmas-tree-
packet/ 
White Team, 2018. Group assignment YTCP0400 After Action Report, Cyber Security 
Exercise. YTCP0400 Cyber Security Exercise Report, May 2018. JAMK University of 
Applied Sciences 
YBANK Blue Team. 2018. Assets and risk analysis – YBANK. YTCP0400 Cyber Security 
Exercise Report, March 2018. JAMK University of Applied Sciences 
YSHOP Blue Team 2018. YShop Business Model : Cyber Exercise Group Assignment. 
YTCP0400 Cyber Security Exercise Report, March 2018. JAMK University of Applied 
Sciences. 
YSOC Blue Team. 2018. Cyber Security Exercise Report: Commercial Security 
Operations Center – YSOC Business Plan, Objectives and Risk Management. YTCP0400 
Cyber Security Exercise Report, March 2018. JAMK University of Applied Sciences. 
YSTORE Blue Team. 2018. YStore Business And Risk Management Process. YTCP0400 
Cyber Security Exercise Report, March 2018. JAMK University of Applied Sciences. 
Zhao, W., White, G. 2014. Designing a Formal Model Facilitating Collaborative 
Information Sharing for Community Cyber Security. Proceedings of the 47th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences 2014, pages:1987 - 1996. Accessed 
24 January 2018. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2014.252  
89 
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1. Survey: Situation Awareness and Cyber threat intelligence 
in WINE 2018 
 
Part 1 Basic Information 
1. The company you worked in as employee? 
 
2. What was your role in your company? 
 
3. If your role changed during exercise, describe how it was changed? 
 
 
Part 2 Your own situation awareness 
4. What tools did you use for maintaining your situation awareness? 
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5. What was the most important situation awareness tool for you (1=most important, 
7=least important)  
 
 
Part 3 You and cyber threat intelligence 
6. Did you collect cyber threat intelligence during exercise? 
 
7. Did you share cyber threat intelligence during exercise? 
 
 
8. What tools did you use to share cyber threat intelligence in your company to your 
co-workers?  
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Part 4 Sharing cyber threat intelligence 
9. Did your company collect cyber threat intelligence during exercise? 
 
10. Did you share cyber threat intelligence during exercise? 
 
11. Did your company share cyber threat intelligence during exercise to other 
companies? 
 
12. What tools did you or your company used to share cyber threat intelligence to 
other companies?  
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Part 5 Receiving cyber threat intelligence 
13. Did your company receive any cyber threat intelligence during the exercise? 
 
14. What tools did your company use to receive cyber threat intelligence from other 
companies?  
 
 
Part 6 Was the cyber threat intelligence used? 
15. Did you use the collected or shared cyber threat intelligence to mitigate threats? 
 
16. Did your company use the cyber collected or shared threat intelligence to mitigate 
threats? 
 
 
Part 7 Quality of the cyber threat intelligence? 
17. Was the collected cyber threat intelligence meaningful? 
 
 
 
18. Was the received cyber threat intelligence meaningful? 
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Part 8 MISP 
19. Did your company share IOC data using MISP? 
 
20. Did your company receive IOC data using MISP? 
 
21. Was the received IOC data meaningful? 
 
22. Free comments about situation awareness, cyber threat intelligence, IOCs and 
MISP? 
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Appendix 2. Survey : MISP and Cyber threat intelligence 
 
1. Was it your own choice to be the employee in your company who collects, handles 
and shares the cyber threat intelligence with the provided tools? 
 
2. How difficult was it to collect cyber threat intelligence during the exercise? 
 
3. How difficult was it to analyze the collected cyber threat intelligence during the 
exercise? 
 
4. Did you discuss the collected cyber threat intelligence with your team member 
when analyzing it? 
 
5. Did you discuss the collected cyber threat intelligence with someone when 
analyzing it? I.e. with someone else in another company? 
 
6. When you shared cyber threat intelligence to another company, did you get any 
feedback or questions about it from their experts? 
 
7. When you received cyber threat intelligence from another company, did you give 
any feedback or questions about it to their experts? 
 
8. When you received some cyber threat intelligence from another company, did you 
trust it (0-5)? 
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9. Do you think that your own shared cyber threat intelligence was trusted (0-5)? 
 
10. Overall quality of your own collected and shared cyber threat intelligence (0-5)? 
 
11. Overall quality of received cyber threat intelligence (0-5)? 
 
12. Quality of the received cyber threat intelligence? (0=not received,1=low quality, 
5=very high quality) 
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13. In the cyber threat intelligence context are the following terms clear to you? (1= 
don't understand at all, 5=I'm expert on this topic) 
 
14. Now, when you have used MISP a little bit, how easy is it to use it and store 
following cyber threat intelligence information with it? (1= easy, 5=very hard) 
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15. How easy was it to collect and store cyber threat intelligence with following tools? 
(1= easy, 5=very hard) 
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Appendix 3. YSOC incident handling process 
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Appendix 4. Malicious IPv4 address lists in RGCE 
The bolded IPv4 addresses were accessible in the game environment RGCE. Some of 
the selected IPv4 addresses were quite like the addresses that were a part of the bot 
net in the game environment. The IPv4 lists also contained the address of twitter.org 
and cnn.org. 
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 
192.58.88.58 193.110.98.38 193.110.98.58 
24.122.128.232 192.58.88.32 192.58.88.41 
94.85.118.5 171.253.64.73 32.124.148.73 
57.198.234.114 250.136.61.163 130.199.219.153 
140.125.103.163 142.21.166.153 249.47.14.106 
12.48.98.207 193.110.98.51 4.60.6.44 
87.67.153.145 107.83.170.152 231.222.198.178 
193.110.98.12 169.255.4.216 23.53.162.30 
192.49.72.154 45.74.121.175 168.14.5.195 
3.13.32.100 246.98.227.12 226.52.108.47 
192.58.88.14 168.253.206.2 149.30.210.163 
171.35.15.177 23.53.162.30 240.137.206.53 
52.113.133.120 87.43.13.19 159.123.96.255 
165.103.39.183 4.60.6.44 1.200.227.221 
40.113.169.0 68.245.127.202 163.60.132.26 
154.48.197.50 120.162.93.102 160.178.70.129 
193.110.98.28 241.168.147.239 251.164.36.36 
250.80.191.71 98.96.89.104 112.46.88.112 
223.37.196.141 52.42.17.39 35.247.195.227 
81.42.160.9 221.67.31.231 
 
192.58.88.38 65.141.11.204 
 
29.166.30.209 
  
106.247.70.216 
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Appendix 5. Malicious domain names in RGCE 
The bolded computer and domain names were resolving in the game environment 
RGCE and 4 of them had valid web servers up and running. Some of the computers 
looked like they were part of the bot net in the game environment. 
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 
www.speedtestbeta.com www.stopitplz.com 
 
www.timoteiteatteri.fi 
 
172.red-193-110-
98.DynamicIP.rima-tde.net 
236.red-193-110-
98.DynamicIP.rima-tde.net 
www.infopaypal.com 
65840C0.cust-a.sonera.fi 124.red-193-110-
98.DynamicIP.rima-tde.net 
16.red-193-110-
99.DynamicIP.rima-
tde.net 
adfrut.cl ce5840C0.cust-a.sonera.fi 23.red-193-110-
99.DynamicIP.rima-
tde.net 
stoneb.cn www.thoosje.com 199.red-193-110-
99.DynamicIP.rima-
tde.net 
375840C0.cust-a.sonera.fi alchenomy.com 215840C0.cust-a.sonera.fi 
230.red-193-110-
98.DynamicIP.rima-tde.net 
cowbears.nl 425840C0.cust-a.sonera.fi 
setjetters.com qhhxzny.gov.cn andlu.org 
shema.firstcom.co.kr anafartalartml.k12.tr din8win7.in 
sinopengelleriasma.com bartnagel.tv okboobs.com 
zotasinc.com centro-moto-guzzi.de qwepa.com 
chinalve.com dinkelbrezel.de stroyeq.ru 
hncopd.com dittel.sk yixingim.com 
www.prjcode.com empe3net7.neostrada.pl huohuasheji.com 
xinyitaoci.com huidakms.com.cn man1234.com 
relimar.com iwb.com.cn www.jwdn.net 
tr-gdz.ru 
 
blacksoftworld.com 
valetik.ru 
 
bradyhansen.com 
frankfisherfamily.com 
 
stabroom.cn 
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Appendix 6. Malware information 1 
 
Malware file name SHA1 
springishere.exe   cd1c52ae818ea4c2ff22fd4862465a18da1815e3 
RNA.exe   284d2e467bd9830b1b4038aa7d71b8dc43bacd1c 
twitter.exe   99ec7480e50221b9cb838ec9551913a98cf7c4cf 
name.exe   ae45e3277226b6f039c3270b9c174cb8fd919f2c 
education.exe   a285cbf30dadc7c0bee006c225a371e253f739fb 
littleboy.exe   81b6d216c0dde054c4a127f1615f96cf4fb56b21 
wonderwoman.exe   f7b8ea5d858d2ebaa63dd6aa0fad6611c0c24cc2 
otherway.exe   e52d78435323e3c7c878129306e234ca79ffc2ad 
firewallsettings.exe   5a39cc3076d4a5e76f3b4d1abda4044e7151fc42 
recipe.pdf   eacef86e09a3182ba6d77d4a52d38e4b9e1c2954 
provide.pdf   7d8d8d5027fd32f875d531b3f4982fd520a6e7e4 
holdme.pdf   733feaf98ae0bd39420650ecf470b58f20ce6d75 
ysocvpninstructions.pdf   a9c54177d821edba3ec3d87e1005b7227fdb1bd8 
yshopcustomerlist.pdf   31176c2bf29c5a9643b3ac7a3a2cf8bd10d8e076 
ystoreadminaccounts.pdf   514774c1d7bfc8090c9969fd58d191306ed5811d 
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Appendix 7. Malware information 2 
Malware file name SHA1 
helloworld.exe   976a278fb679a55e1f36c95d24b00ab5f495017c 
ping.exe   dd8cf1321385167fd784c2c0477cd0c7fb66517e 
hundredeuros.exe   9b38195ee2c0ffd75dc35b9a166d1c44dc6055ad 
YouMrs.exe   6bafcfa0ee983914ff5d6f6309628133b1dfb5fa 
space.exe   5906115c1b17d06c109f5e1988f0448a013e58e8 
indeed.exe   e49621297d5917971508609fb8dcb288760b34a 
givememoney.exe   81c293ee700e67385dba0470ffc574b4a3807b48 
creditcard.exe   a560fecddd45877c18cc614d078590054fe244f6 
paymemoney.exe   13defabf949f0dd7ffcf30aaffdd620670e780d8 
buttcoin.exe   3997e59b486640cb74e73942428f282f3de89bb5 
gameaccounts.pdf   56758c3bed5cbdc22c2224160dc544bf539f5437 
ysocHRreport.pdf   37439079cf76f0b99f0b1ea9dbfa43086cf10908 
ybankfloorplan.pdf   d18d41c0bbe93421fb8f951b6d6c5f129c96df37 
pythonforhackers.pdf   bd634092f8b6e64823fa2045a080c3b6f01f04cc 
salary.pdf  79b0258a299595ac8c58a3bd9b5836d1dbb3de18 
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Appendix 8. Malware information 3 
Malware file name SHA1 
mail.exe   39739d2324bac3725b30516a30996609c604075 
ysoc.exe   5afda0b737caed7a2e7a594c156a225ce89db9ad 
ybankfirewall.exe   2e25be8ae5a85c64213a8fe8d9656238c3837a0b 
hello_yshop.exe   976a278fb679a55e1f36c95d24b00ab5f495017c 
ping.exe   dd8cf1321385167fd784c2c0477cd0c7fb66517e 
ystorebuttcoins.exe   9b38195ee2c0ffd75dc35b9a166d1c44dc6055ad 
YourAccount.exe   6bafcfa0ee983914ff5d6f6309628133b1dfb5fa 
givememoney.exe   81c293ee700e67385dba0470ffc574b4a3807b48 
creditcard.exe   a560fecddd45877c18cc614d078590054fe244f6 
paymemoney.exe   13defabf949f0dd7ffcf30aaffdd620670e780d8 
buttcoin.exe   3997e59b486640cb74e73942428f282f3de89bb5 
wine2018.exe   a392ba018f22ea56b38896428a2ff8bf77243499 
firewallsettings.pdf   5a39cc3076d4a5e76f3b4d1abda4044e7151fc42 
vpn.pdf   9c54177d821edba3ec3d87e1005b7227fdb1bd8 
ystorecustomerlist.pdf   31176c2bf29c5a9643b3ac7a3a2cf8bd10d8e076 
yshopeadminaccounts.pdf   514774c1d7bfc8090c9969fd58d191306ed5811d 
paloaltoinfo.pdf   eb50063b8151c1f08ec716ac21ddcab6527e3617 
ystoreofficelocations.pdf   5aff82ed45ca2409926b74a0ae86a0d6706939b6 
HRQuery.pdf   37439079cf76f0b99f0b1ea9dbfa43086cf10908 
floorplan.pdf   d18d41c0bbe93421fb8f951b6d6c5f129c96df37 
salary.pdf  79b0258a299595ac8c58a3bd9b5836d1dbb3de18 
customersolutions.pdf   1960b1678b2db3c6eaac535e6e54dca3ea03f239 
ystorehowtodetecthacker.pdf   5d2e8d9c621eb0b918321fa40319d727ca10294c 
yshopsocteam.pdf   1c8071ea274be2ff01b7fad0c93da94239733618 
ysocnetworkdiagram.pdf   2bb942011af5f0ebd8cc69b0a968be0f43589690 
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Appendix 9. False user accounts 
Finish user Password English user password 
Julia Virta-Lappalainen   1dVV8LYv Robert Logan   L4N6JdOb 
Hannu Tuhakka   6Krbavg Bryan Pennington   Rk21IWOk 
Veikko Lindholm   G5yWC0o Lindsay Snyder   n4ZiQNjb 
Ville Ihalainen   2kmCrpHz Nicholas Elliott  0RPPqWTw 
Elina Pääkkönne-Tiainen   2ni2PhwI Mark Montoya   1uZAfZxT 
Esko Mononen   L0tXRrrc Samantha Cisneros   5vB75Exy 
Esteri Silvennoinen-Saarela   m7GLPvPt Natalie Holmes   7jRf2Ene 
Elina Marttila-Martikainen   X0QSEEbO Michelle Young   p7TzGIVn 
Sakari Sillanpää-Hyvärinen  1nj7KUck Christine Stanton   9WoVOuJy 
Olavi Kyllönen-Heinonen   6RsT2aqo Zachary Burke   8K06Drjn 
Johannes Anttila   B0cwfsQx Crystal Briggs   8EcjlU2p 
Alma Huttunen   b0pAyZBo Zachary Harris   gEx7QAFp 
Annikki Savolainen   76f9SB2x Jason Morton   dF3M1dZI 
Jani Hiltunen   L7Gfajra Sierra Thompson   AeG0rVZc 
Juhani Jäntti   A7ECXw3z Penny Miller   e4hxLCku 
Oliver Heikkinen-Liukkonen   q6jXVqg5 Robert Garcia   q9TkHIVn 
Erik Vartiainen   Gd7NzHsk Luis Burns   5hk8Fggu 
Raimo Leinonen   xYm92Vzu Michael Gill   6jkDSlgH 
Pete Vainio   gyCUAQs Shelia Quinn   94iSoOnz 
Ari Tyyppä   eUP4wjV Sue Freeman   81wFVbAl 
Linnea Heinonen   sk4dQQgK Linda Davis   9tAz4siq 
Sinikka Pakarinen   0GrwysjE Angela Torres   vC816YNb 
Pekka Leino  P8OUWrp0 Logan Graves   j7FDKwer 
Johanna Oja-Niemi   biJYngN Evan Drake   D26JgUgK 
Hannu Puhakka   6Krbavg Melissa Harrison   efs6NJYp 
Lauri Lepistö  gP6MAekI Michelle Perry   U8QFZpfB 
Maria Perälä-Siren   FK2NaTdI Alicia Cherry   x5ipJLmT 
Eemeli Konemainen   AoTyI9c Katie Anderson   0Oxha73D 
Kalervo Korpela   r07Yq4a1 Susan Perez   vncN4jUm 
Santeri Laakkonen   tl0uZHOs Michael Evans   62FDGfwN 
Matti Tuominen   5y8Xmmn Joshua Bauer   x6evFyqG 
Jasmiina Marjala   lpv6MAf Tracey Brown   l3crZJXm 
Lasse Eronen   A4OxdNV Sarah Peterson   9C5y4fPB 
Joona Harjamäki   ld7zbZg3 Daniel Smith   7eLvYAlm 
Kasper Paasilinna   9u7DfgX Rebecca Dixon   36WBzLwl 
Miika Anttinen   mEQhzhZ Tammy Harrington   6I56xKO9 
Maria Viitanen   U0N71yXn Tracy Ayala   3EId7exO 
Sisko Jäntti   4kCviD4n Joshua Barnes   j7ctDyw0 
Kalevi Nieminen-Myllymäki   25hGuGJg Sharon Rodriguez   V6Bkrqvr 
Kaija Paloniemi   sR4rU26 Krista Santiago   f9VlQ1Wa 
Terttu Hartikainen-Rintala   n1htTCfu Brenda Taylor   f19ANzto 
Tellervo Miettinen   D5JsZjiw Parker Bell   6JRn9Eis 
Iines Ruonansuu   VfcQP9p Michael Scott   hN3TYQBy 
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Appendix 10. MISP Suspicious person : manilapikes 
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Appendix 11. MISP event containing malware info and malicious ip’s 
The data of Appendices 4-8 was used in MISP event to generate an event, where 
malicious IPs are distributing a set of malware, which is then communicating to some 
other IPs. 
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Appendix 12. FINESTONIA threat actor information 
CNN news bulletin: 
 
Twitter account profile picture: 
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Appendix 13. CNN CVE news 
Example of a CVE news bulletin: 
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Appendix 14. Telia OSINT emails 
Email containing malicious IPv4 addresses: 
 
Email containing vulnerability information: 
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Appendix 15. pastebin  dataleaks 
Malware information, uses information from Appendices 6-8: 
 
Leaked user names and passwords, uses data from Appendix 9: 
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Appendix 16. Christmas Tree malicious code in GitLab (Wood 2013) 
This code attacks against YSOC email server, all TCP header flags are set to 1. 
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Appendix 17. Suspicious user markek00310 posts in imgr.com 
 
 
 
  
113 
 
 
Appendix 18. Suspicious twitter accounts 
marek00310: same account name in gitlab.com, imgr.com 
 
pakilanmies aka manilapikes: old stories in CNN news, MISP event, existing bank 
account 
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Appendix 19. Suspicious bank account : manilapikes 
 
 
